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This paper studies a New Keynesian model of a two-country world with a zero lower bound 
(ZLB) constraint for nominal interest rates. A floating exchange rate regime is assumed. The 
presence of the ZLB generates multiple equilibria. The two countries can experience recurrent 
liquidity traps induced by the self-fulfilling expectation that future inflation will be low. These 
“expectations-driven” liquidity traps can be synchronized or unsynchronized across countries. In 
an expectations-driven liquidity trap, the domestic and international transmission of persistent 
shocks to productivity and government purchases differs markedly from shock transmission in a 
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This paper studies fluctuations of inflation, real activity and the exchange rate in a two-country 
New Keynesian sticky-prices model. A zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint for nominal interest 
rates is imposed. When the ZLB binds, i.e. in a “liquidity trap”, the central bank cannot stimulate 
real activity by lowering the policy rate (Keynes (1936), Hicks (1937)). The recent experience of 
persistent low interest rates and low inflation in many advanced economies has led to a 
resurgence of theoretical research on liquidity traps. Two types of liquidity traps have been 
discussed in the literature:  Firstly, an extensive modeling strand building on Krugman (1998) 
and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) considers “fundamentals-driven”  liquidity traps that are 
induced by large shocks to household preferences, or to other fundamentals, which sharply 
reduce aggregate demand and push the nominal interest rate to the ZLB.
1
 Secondly, Benhabib, 
Schmidt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a,b; 2002a,b) have studied “expectations-driven” liquidity traps, 
namely liquidity traps that are induced by the self-fulfilling expectation that future inflation will 
be low; Benhabib et al. show that the combination of the ZLB constraint and an “active” Taylor 
monetary policy interest rate rule gives rise to multiple equilibria, and that expectations-driven 
liquidity trap can arise even when there are no shocks to fundamentals. Fundamentals-driven 
liquidity traps have been analyzed in both open- and closed economies;
 2
 by contrast, the 
literature on expectations-driven liquidity traps has concentrated on closed economies.  
The contribution of the present paper is to study expectations-driven liquidity traps in 
open economies; a floating exchange rate regime is assumed.
3
 The cause of liquidity traps 
matters for the dynamics of the world economy. A model with expectations-driven ZLB regimes 
is better suited for generating persistent liquidity traps than a theory of fundamentals-driven ZLB 
regimes. A key finding is that expectations-driven ZLB regimes can either be synchronized or 
unsynchronized across countries: the cross-country correlation of expectations-driven liquidity 
traps is indeterminate, and unrelated to the correlation of fundamental business cycle shocks. By 
                                                 
1 Among many other models with fundamentals-driven liquidity traps, see Christiano et al. (2011), Holden 
(2016,2019) and Roeger (2015) for detailed references to the related literature.  
2 For analyses of fundamentals-driven liquidity traps in open economies, see, e.g., Jeanne (2009, 2010), Erceg and 
Lindé (2010), Cook and Devereux (2013, 2016), Fujiwara and Ueda (2013), Gomez et al. (2015), Farhi and Werning 
(2016), Blanchard et al. (2016), Acharya and Bengui (2018), Corsetti et al. (2018), Fornaro and Romei (2019), 
Badarau and Sangaré (2019), Balfoussia et al. (2020) and Farhi et al. (2020).  
3 Kollmann (2020) studies expectations-driven liquidity traps, in a model of a currency union, in which liquidity 
traps are perfectly correlated across countries (all countries face the same policy rate). In a floating exchange rate 
regime (studied here), asynchronous expectations-driven liquidity traps can occur, and exchange rate adjustment 
plays a key role for domestic and international shock transmission.  
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contrast, the cross-country correlation of fundamentals-driven liquidity traps equals the 
international correlation of the shocks triggering those traps. I show that the domestic and 
international transmission of fundamental business cycle shocks (disturbances to productivity, 
government purchases and household preferences) in an expectations-driven liquidity trap can 
differ markedly from shock transmission in a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap.  
The model variants with expectations-driven liquidity traps studied here postulate that a 
country’s ZLB regime is solely driven by agents’ self-fulfilling inflation expectations; in those 
model variants, fundamental shocks are assumed to be sufficiently small, so that fundamental 
shocks cannot trigger a change in the ZLB regime. This allows a sharp distinction between 
expectations-driven liquidity traps and fundamentals-driven liquidity traps (that are induced by 
large fundamental shocks).  
Building on Arifovic et al. (2018) and Aruoba et al. (2018),  I consider equilibria with 
expectations-driven liquidity traps in which the policy function for inflation depends on the ZLB 
regime and on the natural real interest rate (i.e. the expected real interest rate that would obtain 
under flexible prices). The natural real interest rate is stationary. Thus, the inflation rate, in an 
expectations-driven liquidity trap too is stationary.
4
 Away from the ZLB, a policy of inflation 
targeting (implemented via an “active” Taylor rule) ensures that the actual real interest rate 
tracks the naturel real interest rate. Persistent fundamental shocks only have a muted effect on 
the natural real interest rate, as the latter is a function of expected growth rates of the 
fundamental drivers. Away from the ZLB, persistent shocks thus trigger muted responses of 
inflation. In an expectations-driven liquidity trap, the inflation response to persistent shocks too 
is muted.  
This explains why the transmission of persistent fundamental shocks to domestic and 
foreign real activity and the real exchange rate, in an expectations-driven liquidity trap, is similar 
to transmission when the economy is away from the ZLB, and to transmission in a flex-prices 
world. In particular, a persistent positive shock to Home country productivity raises Home 
output, and it depreciates the Home terms of trade and real exchange rate; a persistent positive 
shock to Home government purchases raises Home output and appreciates the Home terms of 
trade. For a trade elasticity greater than unity, as assumed in many macro models, the present 
                                                 
4 This explains why an expectations-driven liquidity trap does not exhibit the explosive backward dynamics of 
inflation and the strong sensitivity to shocks that characterize fundamentals-driven liquidity traps; see below.  
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model with expectations-driven liquidity traps predicts that a persistent rise in Home productivity 
raises Home net exports and lowers Foreign output, while a persistent rise in Home government 
purchases lowers Home net exports and raises Foreign output. Domestic and foreign output 
multipliers of persistent fiscal spending shocks are smaller than unity, in expectations-driven 
liquidity traps.   
A fundamentals-driven liquidity trap generates very different responses to persistent 
shocks. Analyses of fundamentals-driven liquidity traps presented in the literature postulate a 
baseline liquidity trap scenario in which a large shock to preferences (or other fundamentals) 
moves the unconstrained nominal interest rate into negative territory; the liquidity trap ends 
when the (mean-reverting) unconstrained nominal rate becomes non-negative again (e.g., Erceg 
and Lindé (2010), Cochrane (2017)). Inflation during the fundamentals-driven liquidity trap is 
determined by iterating the Euler and Phillips equations backward, from the trap exit date. The 
“backward” dynamics of inflation (during the liquidity trap) is explosive. Therefore, small 
exogenous shocks that are added to the baseline fundamentals-driven liquidity trap scenario can 
have big effects on inflation, during the liquidity trap. In the model here, a positive Home 
productivity shock, occurring during a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap, triggers a sizable fall 
in Home inflation on impact; this sizable drop in inflation lowers Home output and consumption 
and appreciates the Home terms of trade and the Home real exchange rate. By contrast, a 
positive shock to Home government purchases induces a sharp rise in Home inflation, which 
strongly boosts Home output and depreciates the Home real exchange rate. The previous 
literature on fundamentals-driven liquidity traps has highlighted non-standard (topsy-turvy) 
output responses to productivity shocks, as well as the large fiscal multipliers in fundamentals-
driven liquidity traps (e.g., Eggertsson (2010), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012)). However, the 
“unorthodox” response of the real exchange rate to productivity and fiscal shocks has apparently 
not previously been noticed.
5
  
I find that international spillovers of fundamental business cycle shocks can be much 
larger and qualitatively different in fundamentals-driven liquidity traps than in expectations-
driven liquidity traps. For a trade elasticity greater than unity, model variants with a 
fundamentals-driven liquidity trap predict that a rise in Home productivity lowers Home net 
                                                 
5
 Standard macro models predict that, away from the ZLB, a positive shock to a country’s productivity depreciates 
its real exchange rate, while a rise in government purchases appreciates its real exchange rate.   
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exports and raises Foreign output, while a rise in Home government purchases raises Home net 
exports and lowers Foreign output. These international spillover effects are opposite of those 
predicted in an expectations-driven liquidity trap, with persistent shocks (see above).     
Shocks transmission in an expectations-driven liquidity trap is more similar (at least 
qualitatively) to transmission under a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap, when fundamental 
shocks are transitory. Intuitively, transitory fundamental shocks have a stronger effect on the 
natural real interest rate than persistent shocks. In a liquidity trap, a transitory shock drives a 
larger wedge between the actual real interest rate and the natural real rate. An “active” Taylor 
rule implies that, away from the ZLB,  the nominal interest rate is cut aggressively in response to 
a short-lived positive productivity shock, which stabilizes inflation, boosts output and triggers a 
depreciation in the (nominal and real) exchange rate. In an expectations-driven liquidity trap, the 
nominal interest rate cannot adjust, which triggers a transitory drop in inflation, a fall in domestic 
consumption and output and an exchange rate appreciation. These responses are qualitatively 
similar to the responses predicted under a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap.  
This paper contributes to a burgeoning literature on business cycle models with 
expectations-driven liquidity traps, but that literature has assumed closed economies (as 
mentioned earlier). The paper is related to Mertens and Ravn (2014) who showed, in a closed 
economy model, that the effect of fiscal shocks differs across expectations-driven and 
fundamentals-driven liquidity traps (fiscal spending multipliers are smaller in an expectations-
driven liquidity trap). Given the recent experience of persistent liquidity traps in several major 
economies (Euro Area, US, Japan), it is important to study the effect of expectations-driven 
liquidity traps in models of the global economy, for a range of domestic and external shocks. 
This seems especially relevant as models of fundamentals-driven liquidity traps are assumed in 
influential policy studies that contribute to the ongoing monetary strategy debates in the US and 
the Euro Area; see, e.g., Andrade et al. (2019, 2020), Coenen et al. (2020) and Erceg et al. 
(2020). Other recent studies on expectations-driven liquidity traps include Aruoba et al. (2018), 
Benigno and Fornaro (2018) and Nakata and Schmidt (2020), who also provide detailed 
references to the literature. By contrast to the paper here, that literature has not identified the key 
role of shock persistence for the transmission of business cycle shocks, in an expectations-driven 
liquidity trap. 
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2. Model of a two-country world  
I consider a New Keynesian open economy model with a standard structure of goods, labor and 
financial markets (e.g., Kollmann (2001, 2002, 2004)). There are two countries, referred to as 
Home (H) and Foreign (F). Each country has its own currency. The exchange rate is flexible.  In 
each country there are: (i) a central bank that sets the local short-term nominal interest rate; (ii) a 
government that makes exogenous purchases which are financed using lump-sum taxes; (iii) a 
representative infinitely-lived household; (iv) monopolistic firms that produce a continuum of 
differentiated tradable intermediate goods using domestic labor; (v) competitive firms that 
bundle domestic and imported intermediates into  composite non-tradable goods that are used for 
household and government consumption. Intermediate goods prices are sticky (in producer 
currency); all other prices are flexible. Each country’s household owns the domestic firms, and it 
supplies labor to those firms (labor is immobile internationally). The labor market is competitive; 
wages are flexible. For analytical tractability, the model abstracts from physical capital. The 
Foreign country is a mirror image of the Home country. The following description focuses on the 
Home country. Analogous conditions describe the Foreign country.  
 
2.1. Home firms 
The Home country’s household consumes a composite final consumption good ,H tC  that is 
produced using the Cobb-Douglas technology 
1
, , ,( / ) ( /(1 ))
H F
H t H t H tC Y Y
ξ ξξ ξ −≡ − where ,
H
H tY  and ,
F
H tY  
are, respectively, a composite of domestic intermediate goods and a composite of imported 
intermediates, used by country H. (The superscript on intermediate good quantities denotes the 
country of origin, while the subscript indicates the destination country.) There is a bias towards 
using local intermediates, in household consumption: 0.5<ξ<1. Each country produces a distinct 
set of intermediates indexed by s∈[0,1]. (Intermediate good ‘s’ produced by country H differs 
from intermediate ‘s’ produced by country F.) The composite intermediate ,
k
H tY  is given by 
1
( 1)/ /( 1)
, ,
0
{ ( ( )) }k kH t H tY y s ds
ν ν ν ν− −≡ ∫ with ν>1, for k=H,F,  where , ( )kH ty s   is the quantity of the variety s 
intermediate input produced by country k  that is sold to country H, for household consumption.   
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Home government consumption, denoted , ,H tG  too is a composite of intermediate inputs, 




( 1) / /( 1)
, ,
0
{ ( ( )) }HH t H tG g s ds
ν ν ν ν− −≡ ∫ , where  , ( )HH tg s  is the quantity of the Home produced variety s 
intermediate input that enters Home government consumption. 
Let , ( )k tp s  be the price of intermediate good s produced by country k, where this price is 
expressed in country k currency. The model assumes producer currency pricing (PCP) for 
intermediates: intermediate good prices are set (and sticky) in the currency of the country of 
origin. Home and Foreign intermediate goods markets are integrated. Thus the law of one price 
holds for intermediates. The price of intermediate s produced by country F is , ( )/F t tp s S  in the 
market of country Home, in units if country H currency, where tS  is the nominal exchange rate, 
defined as the price of a unit of Home currency, in units of Foreign currency. Note that a rise in 
tS  represents an appreciation of the Home currency.  
Cost minimization in Home final good production implies: , , , ,( ) ( ( )/ )
H H
H t H t H t H ty s p s P Y
ν−=  and 
, , , ,( ) ([ ( )/ ] / )
F F
H t F t t H t H ty s p s S P Y
ν−= , as well as , , , ,/ ,
H
H t H t H t H tY CPI C Pξ= ⋅ ⋅  , , , ,(1 ) /[ / ]
F






{ ( ) }k t k t
s
P p s ds
ν ν− −
=
≡ ∫  and 1, , ,( ) ( / ) .H t H t F t tCPI P P Sξ ξ−≡  ,k tP  is a price index of 
intermediates produced by country k=H,F, expressed in country k currency. Perfect competition 
in the final goods market implies that the country H final consumption good price is ,H tCPI  (its 
marginal cost). Cost-minimization in Home government consumption requires 
, , , ,( ) ( ( )/ ) .
H
H t H t H t H tg s p s P G
ν−=  
The technology of the firm that produces intermediate good s in country H is: 
, , ,( ) ( ),H t H t H ty s L sθ=  where , ( )H ty s  and , ( )H tL s  are the firm’s output and labor input at date t, 
while , 0H tθ >  is exogenous productivity in country H (all intermediate good producers located 
in a given country have identical productivity).  The firm’s good is sold domestically and 
exported: , , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
H H H
H t H t F t H ty s y s y s g s= + +   
                                                 
6 Empirically, the import content of government spending is much lower than that of private consumption (e.g., 
Bussiere et al. (2013). The main results below do not depend on assuming that the government consumption basket 
differs from the household consumption basket.  
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Intermediate good producers face quadratic costs to adjusting their prices. The real profit, 
in units of Home consumption, of the firm that produces Home intermediate good s is:   
           
21
, , , , , , , , 1 , 12
( ) ( ( ) / ) ( ) / ([ ( ) ( )] / ) ,H t H t H t H t H t H t H t H t H ts p s W y s CPI p s p s Pπ θ ψ − −≡ − − ⋅ − Π⋅   ψ>0 
where ,H tW  is the nominal wage rate in country H. The last term in the profit equation is the real 
price adjustment cost, where 1Π >  is the central bank’s gross inflation target (see below). The 
firm sets , ( )
H
H tp s  to maximize the present value of profits , ,0 ( )
H
t t t H tE sτ ττ ρ π
∞
+ +=∑ , where ,Ht t τρ +  is 
the Home household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption between 
periods t and t+τ.  All Home intermediate good firms face identical decision problems, and they 
set identical prices: , ,( )H t H tp s P=  ∀ s∈[0,1]. The labor input and output are also equated across all 
Home intermediate good firms.  
The Home terms of trade and the real exchange rate (CPI-based) are , ,/t t H t F tq S P P≡  and 
, ,
/ ,
H t F tt tRER S CPI CPI≡  respectively. Note that 
2 1( ) .
t tRER q
ξ −=  Due to household consumption 
home bias (2ξ-1>0), the real exchange rate is an increasing function of the terms of trade. The 
real price of the domestic intermediate good, in units of final consumption, is likewise an 
increasing function of the terms of trade:  
                                                          
1
, ,/ ( ) .H t H t tP CPI q
ξ−=                                                               (1)       
 
2.2. Household preferences and labor supply  
The intertemporal preferences of the representative Home household are described by 
0 , , ,0
( , )t H t H t H ttE U C Lβ
∞
=
Ψ∑  where ,H tC  and ,H tL  are final consumption and aggregate hours 
worked, respectively. 0<β<1 is the household’s steady state subjective discount factor and 
1 1/1
, , , ,1 1/




+= −  is the agent’s period utility function, where η>0 is the 
Frisch labor supply elasticity. , 0H tΨ >  is a stationary exogenous preference shock that alters the 
household’s rate of time preference. The household equates the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and consumption to the real wage rate, which implies  
                                                
1/
, , , ,(1/ )( / ) ( )H t H t H t H tC W CPI L




2.3. Financial markets 
The model assumes complete international financial markets, and so consumption risk is 
efficiently shared across countries. In equilibrium, the ratio of Home to Foreign households’ 
marginal utilities of consumption is, thus, proportional to the Home real exchange rate 
(Kollmann (1991, 1995); Backus and Smith (1993)): , , , ,{ / }/{ / } ,H t H t F t F t tC C RERΨ Ψ =Λ where Λ  is 
a date- and state-invariant term that reflects the (relative) initial wealth of the two countries. I 
assume that the two countries have the same initial wealth, i.e. Λ=1.  Thus:  
                                                      , , , ,/ ( / )/ .H t F t H t F t tC C RER= Ψ Ψ                                                      (3) 
There is also a market for one-period riskless nominal bonds (in zero net supply) that are 
denominated in Home and in Foreign currency, respectively. Let , 1k ti +  denote the nominal 
interest rate on the bond denominated in country k currency, between periods t and t+1. The 
Home household’s Euler equation for the Home currency bond is:  
                                          , 1 , 1 , , , 1 , 1(1 ) ( / )( / )/ 1,
CPI
H t t H t H t H t H t H ti E C Cβ+ + + ++ Ψ Ψ Π =                                   (4) 
where , 1 , 1 ,/
CPI
H t H t H tCPI CPI+ +Π ≡  is the Home gross CPI inflation rate between periods t and t+1.  
 
2.4. Monetary policy 
The Home country’s central bank sets the interest rate , 1H ti +  according to a feedback rule that 
targets , , , 1/H t H t H tP P −Π ≡ , the gross inflation rate of the Home producer price index (PPI), subject 
to the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint , 1 0.H ti + ≥  Specifically, the monetary policy rule is  
                                 , 1 ,1 {1, / ( / ) ( )}H t H ti Max πβ γ β++ = Π + ⋅ Π −Π , 1πγ >                                           (5) 
where Π>1 is the central bank’s gross inflation target. Π/β is the  gross nominal interest rate that 
obtains when the inflation rate equals the central bank’s inflation target. πγ is a parameter that 
captures the central bank’s policy response to inflation. The “Taylor principle” ( 1)πγ >  is 
assumed to hold (“active” monetary policy), when the ZLB constraint is slack: then, a rise in 






2.5. Market clearing  




( ) .k t k t
s
L L s ds
=
=∫  Real GDP ,( )k tY  
equals aggregate intermediate good output, , , , .k t k t k tY Lθ=  Markets for individual intermediates 
clear as intermediate good firms meet all demand at posted prices. This implies 
, , , ,
k k
k t H t F t k tY Y Y G= + +  i.e. aggregate intermediate good output equals the sum of aggregate domestic 
and foreign intermediate good demand. Using the intermediate good demand functions, this 
condition can be expressed as , , , , , , , ,/ (1 ) /[ ]H t H t H t H t F t F t t H t H tY CPI C P CPI C S P Gξ ξ= + − +  and 
, , , , , , , ,(1 ) /[ / ] / .F t H t H t F t t F t F t F t F tY CPI C P S CPI C P Gξ ξ= − + +   
 
2.6. Solving the model 
Following much of the previous literature on macro models with a ZLB constraint (see Holden 
(2016, 2019) for detailed references), I linearize all equations, with the exception of the 
monetary policy rule (5). This allows to capture the macroeconomic effects of the occasionally 
binding ZLB constraint, while keeping analytical tractability.  
I take a linear approximation around a symmetric steady state in which (in both countries) 
the gross inflation rate equals the inflation target Π; the corresponding steady state gross interest 
rate is 1 /i β+ =Π . Let ( )/t tx x x x≡ −  denote the relative deviation of a variable tx  from its steady 
state value x≠0 (variables without time subscript denote steady state values). To simplify the 
analytical expressions, I assume that government purchases are zero, in steady state.
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  I define 
, , /k t k t kG G Y≡  as the ratio of government purchases to steady state GDP in country k=H,F.  
Linearization of the risk-sharing condition (3) and of the (intermediate) goods market 
clearing conditions gives:  
                                      , , , ,(2 1)H t F t t H t F tC C qξ− = − − + Ψ −Ψ ,                                          (6) 
  , , , ,(1 ) 2 (1 ) ,H t H t F t t H tY C C q Gξ ξ ξ ξ= + − − − +    , , , ,(1 ) 2 (1 )F t H t F t t F tY C C q Gξ ξ ξ ξ= − + + − + .        (7) 
The linearized bond Euler equation (4) of country k=H,F is:  
                                                 
7The analysis below will allow for both positive and negative shocks to government purchases. An interpretation of 
negative government purchases is that government occasionally has an autonomous supply of resources that it 
distributes to the private sector.  
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                                , 1 , 1 , 1 , , , 11 { }
CPI
k t t k t k t k t k t k ti E C C+ + + ++ = Π + − +Ψ −Ψ .                                       (8) 
Linearizing the first-order condition of the intermediate good firms’ decision problem in 
country k=H,F gives a standard ‘forward-looking’ Phillips equation:   
                                            , , , 1,k t w k t t k tmc Eκ β +Π = ⋅ + Π                                                      (9) 
where , , , 1/k t k t k tP P −Π ≡ , while , , , ,( / ) /k t k t k t k tmc W Pθ=  is real marginal cost, deflated by the domestic 
producer price index, in country k’s intermediate good sector (e.g., Kollmann (2002)). 0wκ >  is a 
coefficient that is a decreasing function of the price adjustment-cost parameter ψ. Using the 
nominal wage rate implied by the Home household’s labor supply equation (2) (and the 
analogous Foreign equation) allows to express Home and Foreign real marginal costs as:  
          1 1, , , ,(1 ) (1 )H t H t H t H t tmc C Y qη η θ ξ= + − + − −  and 1 1, , , ,(1 ) (1 ) .F t F t F t F t tmc C Y qη η θ ξ= + − + + −        (10) 
Expressing the monetary policy interest rate rule (5) using ‘hatted’ variables gives  
                                   , 1 ,(1 ) { ( )/ , }.k t k ti Max πβ γ++ = − Π− Π ⋅Π                                           (11) 
Note that the interest rate , 1(1 )k ti ++  is a non-linear function of inflation. The ZLB constraint binds 
when , ( )/ .k tπγ βΠ ≤ − Π− Π  
 Using the risk sharing condition (6), the market clearing conditions (7) can be written as:  
              , , , , ,(1 )( )H t H t H t F t H tY Z Gξ= − − Ψ −Ψ +    and   , , , , ,(1 )( )F t F t H t F t F tY Z Gξ= + − Ψ −Ψ + ,           (12) 
where , , (1 )H t H t tZ C qξ≡ − −  and , , (1 )F t F t tZ C qξ≡ + − . Substitution of (12) into (10) allows to express 
real marginal cost in country k as a function of ,k tZ :  
                1 1 1 1, , , , , ,(1 ) (1 ) (1 )( )k t k t k t k t k t l tmc Z Gη η η ηθ ξ= + − + + − − Ψ −Ψ , for k,l∈{H,F}, k≠l.              (13)   
Using (1), the growth factor of country k nominal consumption spending can be expressed as                 
                                            , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 , .
CPI
k t k t k t k t k t k tC C Z Z+ + + +Π + − = Π + −                                           (14) 
Using (14), the Euler equation (8) of country k=H,F can be written in terms of PPI inflation and 
the expected future change of Z:  
                                 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , , 11 { }k t t k t k t k t k t k ti E Z Z+ + + ++ = Π + − +Ψ −Ψ .                                    (15) 
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Next, combine the Euler equation (15) and the interest rate rule (11), and substitute out 
kZ  using the formula for real marginal cost (13) and the Phillips equation (9). This gives the 
following non-linear equation that governs the dynamics of PPI inflation in country k: 
                      11, , , 1 , 2 ,{ ( )/ , } (1 )k t k t t k t t k t k tMax E E r
β β
π κ κ κβ γ
+










       1 1, , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 ,1 1 1( ) [ (1 )] ( ) (1 ) ( ),k t t k t k t t k t k t t k t k t t l t l tr E E G G E E
η
η η ηθ θ ξ ξ ξ+ + + ++ + +≡ − − − − + − Ψ −Ψ − − Ψ −Ψ      
for k,l∈{H,F}, k≠l. 
I will call (16) the “Euler-Phillips” equation of country k. ,k tr  is a function of exogenous 
variables. In a flex-prices world κ=∞ holds, and the Euler-Phillips equation (16) becomes 
, 1 , 1 ,1 k t t k t k ti E r+ ++ − Π = . Thus, ,k tr  is the country k expected gross real interest rate (expressed as a 
relative deviation from the steady state gross real rate), defined in units of country k output, that 
would obtain in a flex-prices world. I refer to  ,k tr  as country k’s natural real interest rate. ,k tr  
only depends on fundamental exogenous forcing variables.  
To solve the model, we have to find processes for Home and Foreign inflation that solve 
the Euler-Phillips equation (16) for k=H,F. Once such processes have been determined, GDP 
(aggregate output), consumption, the terms of trade and net exports can be determined using the 
Phillips equation (9) and the static model equations (see Appendix).  
Note that, in the baseline model considered here, the two countries’ Euler-Phillips 
equations are uncoupled, in the sense that the country k Euler-Phillips equation involves 
domestic inflation, but not foreign inflation. The natural real interest rate is a function of 
domestic productivity and government purchases, but not of foreign productivity and 
government purchases. This helps to understand why, in equilibrium, productivity and 
government purchases shocks have zero spillovers to foreign output and inflation, as shown by 
the simulations below (however, there are non-zero spillovers to foreign consumption, due to 
international risk sharing). Net exports too are unaffected by productivity and government 
purchases shocks, in the baseline model.    
The zero international output spillovers of productivity and government purchases shocks 
reflect the household preferences of the Cole and Obstfeld (1991) type assumed here, i.e. the 
combination of a unitary intertemporal consumption substitution elasticity and a unitary trade 
13 
 
elasticity (substitution elasticity between domestic and imported intermediates); see further 
discussion below. I use this specification as it greatly simplifies the analysis and the presentation. 
In a sensitivity analysis below, I consider a model variant with a non-unitary trade elasticity; that 
model variant generates non-zero cross-country spillovers (see Sect. 5).   
 The subsequent discussion assumes that productivity, government purchases and the 
preference shifter Ψ follow stationary univariate AR(1) processes with a common 
autocorrelation 0≤ρ<1:  , 1 , , 1,k t k t k t
θθ ρθ ε+ += + , 1 , , 1,
G
k t k t k tG Gρ ε+ += +  , 1 , , 1k t k t k tρ ε
Ψ
+ +Ψ = Ψ +  for k=H,F 
where , 1 , 1 , 1, ,
G
k t k t k t
θε ε ε Ψ+ + +  are exogenous mean-zero innovations. This implies that natural real 
interest rates too follow AR(1) processes with autocorrelation ρ. Note that  
          1 1, , , , ,1 1 1(1 ){ [ (1 )] (1 ) }k t k t k t k t l tr G
η
η η ηρ θ ξ ξ ξ+ + +≡ − − + + + − Ψ + − Ψ   for k,l∈{H,F}, k≠l.           (17)         
The country k natural real interest rate is a decreasing function of domestic productivity 
and an increasing function of domestic government purchases and of domestic and foreign 
preference shock. Because of the assumed mean reversion of productivity, a positive productivity 
shock reduces the expected future growth rate of productivity; in a flex-prices economy, a 
positive productivity shock increases consumption on impact; future consumption rises less than 
current consumption, i.e. the expected growth rate of consumption falls, and hence the real 
natural interest rate drops. A similar logic explains why positive fiscal spending and preference 
shocks raise the natural real interest rate.  
 
2.7. Flex-prices world 
In the sticky-prices world, Home and Foreign monetary policies that fully stabilize the domestic 
PPI inflation rate at the central bank’s inflation target, so that , 0k tΠ =  ∀t, would ensure that 
output, consumption, net exports and the terms of trade equal the flex-prices allocation.
 8
  This 
implies that, if inflation responses to exogenous shocks are sufficiently muted in a sticky-prices 
world, the transmission of those shocks to real activity, net exports and the terms of trade 
                                                 
8
 Under flexible prices, real marginal cost is constant. The flex-prices allocation can solved for using the risk-
sharing and market clearing conditions (6),(7), and mark-up equations (10), with , , 0H t K tmc mc= = . Under sticky 
prices, a monetary policy that fully stabilizes PPI inflation (at the inflation target  Π) stabilizes real marginal cost 
(see (9)), and thus it reproduces the flex-prices allocation. When there is a ZLB constraint, the central bank cannot 
guarantee full PPI inflation stabilization,  because of the existing of multiple equilibria (see below).  
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resembles transmission under flexible prices. Therefore, a flex-prices (Real Business Cycle) 
model provides a useful benchmark for understanding the dynamics of real variables in the 
sticky-prices world. The solution of the linearized flex-prices model is:  




+ += + − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ ,   for k,l∈{H,F}, k≠l; 
(1 )(2 )1
, , , , , , ,1 1
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] ( )k t k t k t k t l t k t l tC G G
ξ ξ η
η ηξθ ξ θ ξ ξ
− +
+ += + − − + − + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ   for k,l∈{H,F}, k≠l; 




+ += − − + ⋅ − + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ ; 
     , , ,(1 ) ( )k t k t l tNX ξ= − − ⋅ Ψ − Ψ  for k,l∈{H,F}, k≠l,                                
where ,k tNX  denotes country k net exports (normalized by GDP). 
9
 
Flex-prices output is an increasing function of domestic productivity and domestic 
government purchases, but output does not depend on foreign productivity and foreign 
government purchases. With flexible prices, a positive Home productivity shock increases Home 
output, and it raises the relative price of the Foreign-produced good; thus, the shock has 
opposing income and substitution effects on the demand for Foreign output. The improvement in 
the Foreign terms of trade triggered by the shock raises the Foreign real consumption wage, 
which has opposing income and wealth effects on Foreign labor supply. Under the Cole-Obstfeld 
preference specification, these opposing effects cancel out, and Foreign output does not respond 
to the Home productivity shock. Note that productivity and government purchases shocks do not 
affect net exports. Under flexible prices, the Home terms of trade are a decreasing function of 
relative (Home vs. Foreign) productivity and an increasing function of relative government 
purchases, under flexible prices. A positive country k preference shock raises k’s consumption, 
and lowers k’s output (as the rise in consumption triggers a fall in labor supply). The terms of 
trade are an increasing function of a country’s relative preference shock, under flexible prices.   
 
2.8. Model calibration 
The model simulations discussed below assume that one period in the model represents one 
quarter in calendar time. I set β=0.9975, which implies a 1% per annum steady state riskless real 
                                                 
9
, , , , , , , , ,{ }/{ }.k t k t k t k t k t k t k t k t k tNX P Y CPI C P G P Y≡ − −  Up to a linear approximation, , , , , (1 )H t H t H t H t tNX Y C G qξ= − − + −  and 




interest rate. The Frisch labor supply elasticity is set at unity, η=1, a conventional value in macro 
models. The local content of private consumption spending is set at ξ=0.87. 10 The Central 
Bank’s quarterly gross inflation target is set at Π=1.005, in line with a 2% annual inflation target. 
The inflation coefficient of the interest rate rule (5) is set at the conventional value 1.5.πγ =  The 
slope coefficient wκ  of the Phillips equation (9) is set at a value such that the observationally 
equivalent Phillips curve implied by Calvo (1983) staggered price setting entails an average 
duration between price changes of 4 quarters. This mean duration is consistent with empirical 
evidence on price setting in the Euro Area and the US (see Kollmann (2001), Alvarez et al. 
(2006), Giovannini et al. (2019)).
11
 The preceding parameters are used in all simulations below.  
 For comparison purposes with the simulations of the sticky-prices model, I note that, in 
the flex-prices model (with baseline parameters), the decision rules for Home output, 
consumption, net exports and the terms of trade are:    
, , , , ,0.50 0.06 ( ),H t H t H t H t F tY Gθ= + ⋅ − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ  , , , , , , ,0.87 0.13 0.44 0.06 0.18 ( ),H t H t F t H t F t H t F tC G Gθ θ= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ    
     , , ,0.13 ( ),H t H t F tNX = − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ   , , , , , ,( ) 0.50 ( ) 0.87 ( )t H t F t H t F t H t F tq G Gθ θ= − − + ⋅ − + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ .       (18)  
 
3. Expectations-driven ZLB regimes 
3.1. Steady state equilibria 
The model has multiple bounded solutions. To see this in the simplest possible way, consider 
first a world without shocks to the natural real interest rates: , 1 0k tr + =  ∀t. The steady-state Euler-
Phillips equation is (from (16)): { ( )/ , }k kMax πβ γ− Π− Π ⋅Π = Π  for k=H,F. Given our assumption 
that 1,πγ >  this equation is solved by two steady state (constant) inflation rates: 0kΠ =  and 
( )/ .k βΠ =− Π− Π  The ZLB binds in the latter steady state. In the steady state liquidity trap, 
agents expect that future inflation will be low, which implies that current inflation is low, thus 
causing the ZLB constraint to bind; in other terms, the liquidity trap is “expectations-driven”. 
The multiplicity of equilibria here is in line with Benhabib et al. (2001a,b) who showed (in a 
                                                 
10 This value of ξ matches the fact that, empirically, the US trade share was 13% in the period 1990-2019.   
11 Under Calvo price setting, the slope of the Phillips curve (9) is (1 )(1 )/ ,w D D Dκ β= − −  where 1-D is the 
probability that an individual firm can change its price in a given period, so that the average duration between price 
changes is 1/(1-D). I set D=0.75 (average stickiness of 4 periods), which implies 0.08395.wκ =  
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simpler model) that the combination of the ZLB and an “active” Taylor rule produced two steady 
states and that the ZLB binds in one of these steady states. Note that a steady state liquidity trap 
can arise in country H, irrespective of whether there is a liquidity trap in country Foreign, and 
vice versa.  
 
3.2. Equilibria with shocks to natural real interest rates 
I now construct multiple equilibria for a sticky-prices world with time-varying natural real 
interest rates. The model variants with expectations-driven ZLB regimes considered here 
postulate that a country’s current ZLB regime is solely driven by agents’ self-fulfilling beliefs 
about future ZLB regimes. In those model variants, it is postulated that fundamental shocks 
(shocks to the natural real interest rate) are sufficiently small, so that fundamental shocks cannot 
trigger a change in the ZLB regime. This allows a sharp distinction between expectations-driven 
liquidity traps and fundamentals-driven liquidity traps (that are induced by large fundamental 
shocks); see below.  
 Building on Arifovic et al. (2018) and Aruoba et al. (2018) (who analyzed multiple 
equilibria in closed-economy models with a ZLB constraint), I consider equilibria in which PPI 
inflation in country k=H,F is a function of the country’s ZLB regime and of its natural real 
interest rate. 
12
 Because, in the baseline model, the two countries’ Euler-Philipps equations are 
uncoupled, the equilibrium decision rule for country k PPI inflation only depends on that 
country’s ZLB regime, but not on the ZLB regime of the other country. The inflation decision 
rule for country k is given by:  
                           , ,
B B B
k t k trμ λΠ = +   if country k’s ZLB constraint binds at t;                            (19) 
                          , ,
S S S
k t k trμ λΠ = +   if country k’s ZLB constraint is slack at t,                          (20) 
                                            with   , ,( )/ .
B S
k t k tπ πγ β γΠ ≤ − Π− Π < Π                                               (21) 
                                                 
12 The ZLB regime can be interpreted as determined by an “extrinsic” sunspot variable.  In the analysis here, 
inflation within each ZLB regime is assumed to a function solely of fundamental exogenous variables (via the 
natural real interest rate). There may also exist equilibria in which inflation, during a liquidity trap, depends on 
(other) sunspot variables. This reflects the local indeterminacy induced by the violation of the Taylor principle, in a 
liquidity trap. Analysis of this additional dimension of indeterminacy, in the model here, is left for future research. 
See Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004) for analyses (without the ZLB regime shifts studied in the present paper) of 
multiple sunspot equilibria induced by violations of the Taylor principle. 
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The coefficients of the decision rules  , , ,
B B S Sμ λ μ λ  can be found using the method of 
undetermined coefficients, by substituting (19) and (20) into the Euler-Phillips equation (16).  
 I will first consider equilibria in which each country is in a permanent ZLB regime, as 
closed-form model solutions can easily be derived for that case. I then consider equilibria with 
time-varying ZLB regimes.   
 
3.2.1. Home country in permanent expectations-driven liquidity trap 
This Section studies an equilibrium with time-varying natural real interest rates in which agents 
rationally believe that the Home economy will forever be in a liquidity trap, so that , ,
B
H t H tΠ =Π   
∀t (see (19)).  Then, the Home Euler-Phillips equation (16) becomes:  
                            11 , , 1 , 2 ,( )/ (1 ) .
B B B




+ +− Π− Π = − Π + + Π − Π +                           (22) 
Substitution of the decision rule (19) into (22) gives:  
          1 21 , , , ,( )/ { } (1 ){ } { } ,
B B B B B B
H t H t H t H tr r r r
β β
κ κ κβ μ λ μ λ ρ μ λ ρ
+− Π− Π = − + + + + − + +             (23) 
where I use the fact that (19) implies , ,
B B B s
t H t s H trμ λ ρ+Ε Π = +   for s≥0.  
(23) holds for arbitrary values of ,H tr  iff ( )/
Bμ β=− Π− Π   and  
1 21{ (1 ) } 1 0.Bβ βκ κ κρ ρ λ
+− + + − + =  Thus, the slope of the decision rule in a permanent liquidity 
trap is: 
1 211/{ (1 ) }.B β βκ κ κλ ρ ρ
+=− − + + −  This can be written as ( / )/ ( )Bλ κ β ρ=− Γ , where 
12 1( ) (1 ) .βκ βρ ρ ρ
+Γ ≡ − + + −  Note that 1(0) 0βΓ =− <  and (1) 0;κβΓ = >   furthermore '( ) 0ρΓ >  for 
0 1ρ≤ ≤ . Therefore,  ( ) 0ρΓ >  holds for 0 1,ρ<Ξ< ≤  where Ξ  is the root of the polynomial 
( ) 0.Γ Ξ =  For the values of β,κ assumed in the model calibration (see above), we have Ξ=0.67. 
Empirical estimates of the quarterly autocorrelation of productivity, government purchases (and 
other macroeconomic shocks) are typically in the range between 0.95 and 1, and thus clearly 
larger than Ξ.13  This implies that ( ) 0ρΓ >  holds for an autocorrelation ρ in the empirically 
relevant range. For plausible ρ,  we thus have 0Bλ < , which implies that a rise in the natural 
                                                 
13King and Rebelo (1999) report an empirical estimate of ρ=0.979 for quarterly US total factor productivity. For the 
Euro Area (EA) and the US, the autocorrelations of linearly detrended quarterly real government purchases was 




interest rate lowers the inflation rate, in a permanent liquidity trap, so that inflation is increasing 
in  productivity, and decreasing in government purchases and the preference shifter  (as the 
natural real interest rate is a decreasing function of productivity, and an increasing function of 
government purchases and of the preference shifter Ψ ; see (17)).    
For intuition, note that a persistent rise in the natural real interest rate induces a rise in the 
expected future real interest rate. In a permanent expectations-driven liquidity trap, the nominal 
interest rate is stuck at zero, and the rise in the real interest rate is brought about by a fall in the 
inflation rate. This can be seen most easily when ρ  is very close to (but below) unity. Then 
, , 1 , 2
,
B B B
H t t H t t H t
E E+ +Π ≈ Π ≈ Π  and (22) gives , ,( )/ ,
B
H t H trβΠ ≈ − Π− Π − so that a positive shock to the 
natural real rate triggers (approximately) a one-to-one negative response of the current and 
expected future inflation rate.  
 By contrast, when the natural real interest rate is less persistent, ρ<Ξ, then a positive 
shock to the Home natural real interest rate raises the Home inflation rate, in a permanent 
expectations-driven liquidity trap, and hence a positive productivity shock lowers domestic 
inflation. This can be seen most easily when ρ=0. A one-time Home productivity increase at date 
t lowers the natural real interest rate at t, but it has zero effect on the natural real interest rate at 
t+1; thus, the shock has zero effect on Home inflation at t+1, which implies that the shock also 
has zero effect on Home output and consumption at t+1. The Home Euler equation between t and 
t+1 shows that, hence, consumption at  date  t does not respond to the shock, in a liquidity trap 
(as then the nominal interest rate cannot adjust to the shock). The Home inflation rate at t falls to 
offset the stimulative effect of the one-time productivity increase on Home output, and thereby 
ensure that Home consumption (and output) remain unchanged at t. (When the serial correlation 
of productivity is strictly positive but smaller than Ξ, then it remains true that a positive Home 
productivity shock lowers Home inflation, in an expectations-driven liquidity trap, but the shock 
reduces Home output and consumption; see simulations for the case ρ=0.5 in Sect. 5.)  
Unless stated otherwise, the following simulations assume ρ=0.95,  so that 0.Bλ <
Autocorrelations equal, or close to, 0.95 are widely assumed in macroeconomic models.   
Inflation in a permanent liquidity trap has to satisfy the restriction , {( )/ }
B
H tπγ βΠ ≤− Π− Π   




Bλ <  holds, this requires , (1/ ){( 1)/ }( )/
B
H tr π πλ γ γ β≥ − Π− Π , where the right-hand side 
is negative; thus the natural rate cannot drop too much (to prevent a change in the ZLB regime).  
For ρ=0.95, the decision rule for country H inflation and output, in a permanent liquidity 
trap are  
    , , , , , ,0.0074 1.070 0.0074 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.003 ,
B
H t H t H t H t H t F tr GθΠ = − − = − + − − Ψ − Ψ     
                         , , , , ,0.0001 1.02 0.49 0.08 0.06 .
B
H t H t H t H t F tY Gθ= − + + − Ψ + Ψ                       
Thus, a 1% percent increase in country k productivity raises domestic (gross) inflation by 0.05% 
(this corresponds to a rise of the annualized inflation rate by 0.2 percentage points); while a 1% 
increase in government purchases lowers gross inflation by 0.03%. 
14
 The government purchases 
multiplier (effect on output) is 0.49. Although the rise in government purchases lowers inflation, 
the government purchases multiplier is positive, because a rise in government purchases lowers 
consumption, which raises labor supply. Country H inflation and output do not depend on 
Foreign productivity or Foreign government purchases, in the model version considered here.  
This is due to the fact that the Home Euler-Phillips equation only involves Home inflation, and 
that the Home natural real interest rate does not depend on Foreign productivity or Foreign 
government purchases, as discussed in Sect. 2.6.   
By contrast, Home consumption and the terms of trade depend on both countries’ 
productivity and government purchases shocks. Also, Home consumption and the terms of trade 
depend on the Foreign ZLB regime, but quantitatively the effect of the Foreign ZLB regime is 
negligible. Let ,
BB
H tC  and 
BB
tq  denote country H consumption and the terms of trade when both 
countries are in a permanent liquidity trap. For ρ=0.95, we find:  
          , , , , , , ,0.0001 0.88 0.13 0.44 0.07 0.16 0.18
BB
H t H t F t H t F t H t F tC G Gθ θ= − + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ Ψ − ⋅ Ψ ,  
                                                 




H tπγ βΠ ≤ − Π− Π  requires upper bound restrictions on productivity and lower bound 
restrictions on government purchases and the preference shock. For example, if productivity and the preference 




G ≥−  has to hold: when government purchases fall below this lower 
bound, then the inflation rate rises to a level which is such that the Taylor rule prescribes a strictly positive nominal 
interest rate, which violates (21). 
20 
 
                   , , , , , ,1.02 ( ) 0.51 ( ) 0.88 ( )
BB
t H t F t H t F t H t F tq G Gθ θ= − ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ Ψ − Ψ .    
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Note that shock responses of output, consumption and terms of trade, in a liquidity trap are  
similar to the responses that obtain in flex-prices world (see (18)). This reflects the muted 
response of inflation to persistent fundamental shocks, under sticky prices. In equilibrium, 
inflation is a function of the natural real interest rate; persistent fundamental shocks have a 
muted effect on the natural real interest rate (as the latter depends on the expected future change 
of the fundamentals), which helps to understand the weak effect of these shocks on inflation. As 
pointed out above (Sect. 2.7), if inflation responses to exogenous shocks are sufficiently muted 
in a sticky-prices world, the transmission of those shocks to real activity resembles transmission 
under flexible prices.  
 
3.2.2. Permanently slack ZLB constraint 
I next consider an equilibrium in which country Home stays forever away from the ZLB, so that 
, ,
S
H t H tΠ =Π  ∀t (see (20)). Then Home inflation is governed by the following Euler-Phillips 
equation (from (16)):  
                                11, , , 1 , 2 ,(1 ) .
S S S S
H t t t H t t H t H tE E r
β β
π κ κ κγ
+
Η + +Π = − Π + + Π − Π +                               
Substitution of decision rule (20) into this equation shows that the coefficients of the decision 
rule are  
                                       0
Sμ =  and ( / )/{ ( ) ( / )}.S πλ κ β ρ γ κ β=− Γ − ⋅                                         
1πγ >  (Taylor principle) implies that ( ) ( / ) 0πρ γ κ βΓ − ⋅ <  ∀ 0≤ρ≤1, and so 0 :
Sλ > when the 
ZLB is always slack, then a rise in the natural real interest rate triggers a rise in the inflation rate, 
and thus the nominal interest rate increases.
16
  Away from the ZLB, a rise in Home productivity 
                                                 
15 Denoting by ,
BS
H tC  and 
BS
tq  Home consumption and the terms of trade when H is in a permanent liquidity trap, 
while country F has a permanently slack ZLB constraint, we find   
               , , , , , , ,0.0001 0.88 0.13 0.44 0.06 0.16 0.17
BS
H t H t F t H t F t H t F tC G Gθ θ= − + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ Ψ − ⋅ Ψ ;  
                , , , , , ,0.0001 1.02 0.97 0.51 0.49 0.89 0.84
BS
t H t F t H t F t H t F tq G Gθ θ= − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅Ψ − ⋅ Ψ .  
Thus, the decision rules for ,
BS
H tC  and 
BS
tq are very similar to the decision rules for ,
BB
H tC  and .
BB
tq  
16 Inflation in regime with a permanently slack ZLB constraint has to satisfy the restriction , {( )/ }
S
H tπγ βΠ ≥− Π− Π   
(see (21)), i.e. the inflation rate has to remain sufficiently high to ensure that the ZLB constraint does not binds. This 
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(which reduces the Home natural interest rate) lowers Home inflation, while positive preference 
and government purchases shocks raise inflation. For ρ=0.95, the decision rules for Home 
inflation and output, under a permanently slack ZLB constraint are 
                     , , , , , ,1.77 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.006
S
H t H t H t H t H t F tr GθΠ = = − + + Ψ + Ψ ,               
                                 , , , , ,0.97 0.51 0.04 0.07
S
H t H t H t H t F tY Gθ= + − Ψ + Ψ .                             
Thus, although inflation responses to shocks are qualitatively different than in the permanent 
liquidity trap, we see that inflation responses remain rather weak, due to high shock persistence. 
This helps to understand why output responses to shocks are similar across sticky-prices ZLB 
regimes and the flex-prices economy (see Sect. 3.2.1 and (18)). It can, however, be note that, 
with a permanently slack ZLB constraint, output is slightly less responsive to domestic 
productivity shocks, but slightly more responsive to domestic government purchase shocks than 
in a permanent liquidity trap.  
When both countries are in the regime with a permanently slack ZLB constraint, then 
decision rules for Home consumption and the terms of trade are:  
                , , , , , , ,0.85 0.13 0.42 0.06 0.20 0.17 ,
SS
H t H t F t H t F t H t F tC G Gθ θ= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅Ψ − ⋅Ψ   
                        , , , , , ,0.97 ( ) 0.49 ( ) 0.85 ( ).
SS
t H t F t H t F t H t F tq G Gθ θ= − ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ Ψ − Ψ   
Thus, the consumption and terms of trade equations too are similar to the ones that obtain in a 
permanent liquidity trap, and in the flex-prices economy.  
 When country Home has a permanently slack ZLB constraint, then its nominal interest 
rate, in % p.a. is given by:  
                        , 1 , , , ,400 3.01 .36 0.18 0.33 0.02H t H t H t H t F ti Gθ+⋅ = − + + Ψ + Ψ  
Thus, the nominal interest rate exhibits a muted response to business cycle shocks (e.g. a 1% 
productivity increase raises the interest rate by merely 36 basis points per annum). This also 




                                                                                                                                                             
restriction requires , (1/ )( )/ ,
S
H tr λ β≥− Π− Π  where the right-hand side is strictly negative; thus the natural rate cannot 
drop too much.  
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3.2.3. Time-varying ZLB regimes 
I now consider equilibria in which countries randomly switch between ZLB regimes, because of 
self-fulfilling switches in agents’ inflation expectations. For simplicity, I assume that the ZLB 
regime is independent across countries, and independent of Home and Foreign natural real 
interest rates.  
Assume that the ZLB regime of country k=H,F follows a Markov chain. Denote k’s ZLB 
regime by , { , }k tz B S∈  where ,k tz B=  means that the ZLB constraint binds at date t in country k 
(so that decision rule (19) applies) while ,k tz S=  indicates that the ZLB constraint is slack (and 
decision rule (20) applies). Let the transition probabilities between ZLB regimes be 






Φ ≡ ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
 be  
the matrix of transition probabilities, and define .Φ≡Φ⋅Φ  Let [ ; ]B Sμ μ μ≡  and [ ; ]B Sλ λ λ≡  
denote 2x1 vectors that, respectively, include the intercepts and the slopes of the inflation 
decision rules (19),(20). Expected date t+1 inflation, conditional on the ZLB state and the natural 
real interest rate realized at date t is then:  
              , 1 , , ,( | , ) (1,:){ }k t k t k t k tE z B r rμ λρ+Π = = Φ + , , 1 , , ,( | , ) (2,:){ }k t k t k t k tE z S r rμ λρ+Π = = Φ + ,      
           
2
, 2 , , ,( | , ) (1,:){ }k t k t k t k tE z B r rμ λρ+Π = = Φ + , 
2
, 2 , , ,( | , ) (2,:){ }k t k t k t k tE z S r rμ λρ+Π = = Φ + .  
An equilibrium with recurrent liquidity traps in country k=H,F is defined by decision rule 
coefficients μ,λ and transition probabilities 0 , 1SS BBp p< <  such that inequalities (21) are 
satisfied, and the Euler-Phillips equation (16) holds:  
         1 21 , , , ,( )/ { } (1 ) (1,:){ } (1,:){ }
B B
k t k t k t k tr r r r
β β
κ κ κβ μ λ μ λρ μ λρ
+− Π− Π = − + + + Φ + − Φ + + ,       (24) 
      1 21, , , , ,{ } { } (1 ) (2,:){ } (2,:){ }
S S S S
k t k t k t k t k tr r r r r
β β
π κ κ κγ μ λ μ λ μ λρ μ λρ
++ = − + + + Φ + − Φ + + .      (25) 
Equations (24) and (25) are, respectively, the country k Euler-Phillips equation if the ZLB 
constraint binds and if it is slack, at date t. Stacking (24) and (25) gives:  
1
21
, , , ,1
0( )/ 1
{ } (1 ) { } { }
00 1





μ λ μ λρ μ λρ
γ
+−− Π− Π ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + + + Φ⋅ + − Φ⋅ + + ⋅⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
.   (26) 
(26) holds for arbitrary values of the real natural interest rate ,k tr  iff   
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+−− Π− Π ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = + + Φ − Φ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
,                        (27) 











+−− ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = + + Φ − Φ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ − −−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
.                              
The following condition ensures that the inequality constraints (21) hold for values of ,k tr  
sufficiently close to zero:  
                                                        ( )/ .B Sπ πγ μ β γ μ< − Π− Π <                                                 (28) 
The existence of an equilibrium with time-varying ZLB regimes requires probabilities  SSp  and 
BBp  close to unity.
17
  This implies that the model of expectations-driven liquidity traps is well-
suited for generating long-lasting liquidity traps—in fact that model requires a high expected 
duration of liquidity traps.  
 The following numerical simulations of the model variant with time-varying ZLB 
regimes assume 0.95,SS BBp p= =  which corresponds to an expected regime duration of 20 
periods.  Then, the decision rules for Home inflation and output in the regime with a binding 
ZLB constraint (‘B’) are  
   , , , , , ,0.0080 1.36 0.0080 0.07 0.03 0.064 0.004
B
H t H t H t H t H t F tr GθΠ = − − = − + − − Ψ − Ψ ,   
                          , , , , ,0.0022 1.06 0.47 0.12 0.06 .
B
H t H t H t H t F tY Gθ= − + + − Ψ + Ψ                    
The corresponding decision rules in the regime with a slack ZLB (‘S’) are 
, , , , , ,0.0011 1.28 0.0011 0.06 0.03 0.060 0.004 ,
S
H t H t H t H t H t F tr GθΠ = − + = − − + + Ψ + Ψ    
                       , , , , ,0.0020 0.94 0.53 0.01 0.07
S
H t H t H t H t F tY Gθ= + + − Ψ + Ψ .                         
As ZLB regimes are persistent, it is not surprising that the decision rules are similar to the ones 
that obtain when each regime is permanent (see Sect. 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). Also, note again that the 
output decision rules are quite close to the flex-prices decision rules (see (18)). The same holds 
for the decision rules describing the terms of trade and consumption (see simulated shock 
                                                 
17This is also noted by Arifovic et al. (2018), in a closed economy model.  When  SSp  and BBp  are not sufficiently 
close to unity, then the vector μ determined by (27) violates the inequalities (28). E.g., if agents believe that a  
liquidity trap is transient, then inflation is too high during a liquidity trap (as agents expect a rapid return to the 
‘slack-ZLB’ regime), i.e. a liquidity trap is impossible.  
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responses below). It remains true that, in a liquidity trap, a positive supply shock raises domestic 
inflation, while a positive aggregate demand shock lowers domestic inflation. Importantly, the 
responses of output to productivity and government purchases shocks are again similar across the 
ZLB regimes. The government purchases multiplier is close to 0.5 in both ZLB regimes.   
 The effect of a ZLB regime shift on inflation and output depends on the level of the 
forcing variables. Note that , , , , , ,0.0042 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.01 .
B S
H t H t H t H t H t F tY Y Gθ− =− + − − Ψ − Ψ  
Thus, entry into a liquidity trap has a detrimental effect on domestic output; the detrimental 
effect is greater when productivity is low and government purchases are high.  
 
3.3. Simulated shock responses: expectations-driven ZLB regimes 
Table 1 reports shock responses for the baseline New Keynesian model with expectations-driven 
ZLB regimes. ZLB regime persistence is set at 0.95;SS BBp p= =  the autocorrelation of the forcing 
variables is ρ=0.95. 1% innovations to Home productivity, Home government purchases and to 
the Home preference shifter (Ψ) are considered. Responses 0 and 12 periods after the shock are 
reported; see Column labelled ‘Horizon’.
18
 Responses of Home and Foreign nominal interest 
rates, inflation, output and consumption are shown, as well as responses of the Home terms of 
trade, the nominal exchange rate and Home net exports (normalized by GDP). All responses 
pertain to simulation runs without ZLB regime change. Panel (a) of Table 1 shows responses that 
obtain when both countries are in an expectations-driven liquidity trap, while Panel (b) assumes 
that the ZLB constraint is slack in both countries. A positive Home productivity (government 
purchases) shock triggers an interest rate cut (increase) when Home is away from the ZLB. 
However, shock responses of output, consumption and the real exchange rate are qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar across ZLB regimes. In both regimes, a positive productivity shock 
raises domestic and foreign consumption, and it triggers a nominal and real depreciation of the 
currency of the country receiving the shock; net exports and Foreign output are unaffected by the 
shock. A positive shock to government purchases lowers domestic and foreign consumption and 
it triggers a nominal and real exchange rate appreciation.  
                                                 
18 In the model with expectations-driven liquidity traps, the dynamic shock responses of all variables (except the 
nominal exchange rate) decay geometrically with factor ρ  (for a simulation run without change of ZLB regime). 
Thus it seems unnecessary to show more detailed response trajectories. By contrast, for fundamentals-driven 
liquidity traps, more detailed responses will be reported, as shock responses do not exhibit geometric decay.   
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4. Fundamentals-driven liquidity traps  
As discussed in the Introduction, an extensive literature has considered “fundamentals-driven” 
liquidity traps induced by large shocks to household preferences (or other fundamentals) that 
sharply reduce aggregate demand and push the nominal interest rate to the ZLB. The literature 
shows that, in a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap, fiscal spending multipliers can be markedly 
higher than when the ZLB does not bind; also, a positive technology shock can trigger an output 
contraction (e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)). Many influential studies on liquidity traps 
in open economies have likewise considered fundamentals-driven liquidity traps (see references 
in Sect. 1).  
 For comparison purposes with the expectations-driven liquidity traps analyzed in the 
previous Section, I now discuss a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap, in the two-country model 
used above. Following Blanchard et al. (2016), I consider liquidity traps driven by unanticipated 
one-time shocks at some date t=0 that depress the natural real interest rate below its steady level, 
so that  ,0 0.kr <  Except for shocks at date t=0, there are no random disturbances. Thus the 
economy evolves deterministically (perfect foresight), after t=0. For given initial adverse shocks, 
there exists a unique deterministic equilibrium in which the liquidity trap ends permanently after 
a finite time span.
19
  
As there are no exogenous innovations after date t=0, the natural real interest rate in 
country k=H,F at t≥0 is: , ,0 ,k t k
t
r rρ= ⋅  where 0≤ρ<1 is the autocorrelation of the exogenous 
forcing processes and of the natural real interest rate.  
In a deterministic equilibrium without ZLB constraint, the (gross) inflation rate and the 
(gross) nominal interest rate (expressed in ‘hatted’ form, i.e. as deviations from steady state) of 
country k=H,F at dates t≥0 would be  








i rπγ λ ρ++ =                                       (29) 
                                                 
19 In the model here, the Euler-Phillips equation (16) does not include lagged endogenous state variables. As shown 
by Holden (2016, 2019), this ensures that an equilibrium featuring eventual permanent exit from the liquidity trap is 
unique; models with endogenous state variables may have multiple deterministic equilibria that eventually escape 




Sλ >  is the decision rule coefficient (for inflation) in a regime with a 
permanently slack ZLB constraint (see Sect. 3.2.2). 
20
 A fundamentals-driven liquidity trap 
occurs in country k when the country’s unconstrained nominal interest rate is negative at date 
t=0, i.e. when  
                                                           *,11 ( )/ .ki β+ < − Π− Π                                                           (30) 
This inequality holds when the country k real natural rate at date t=0 is sufficiently low. Assume 
that (30) applies, and let 
*
kT  be the smallest value of t≥0 for which the unconstrained nominal 
rate becomes non-negative again, i.e. *, 11 ( )/ .k ti β++ ≥ − Π− Π  Thus,   
                                     *
*1 ( )/
kT
i β+ < − Π− Π  and ** 11 ( )/ .kTi β++ ≥ − Π− Π                                      
A fundamentals-driven liquidity trap equilibrium has the property that the ZLB constraint binds 
in country k until period 
*
kT -1, and that the ZLB does not bind in 
*.kt T≥  Thus, 
*
, ,k t k tΠ =Π  and 
*
, 1 , 11 1k t k ti i+ ++ = +  hold for 
*
kt T≥  (where * ,k tΠ  and 
*
, 11 k ti ++  are defined in (29)). In periods 
*,kt T<  
the country k nominal interest rate is zero, i.e. , 11 ( )/ .k ti β++ = − Π− Π  From the Euler-Phillips 
equation (16), we see that country k inflation at dates *0 kt T≤ <  has to obey the condition 
11




+ +− Π− Π = − Π + + Π − Π +   Thus,   
                     , , 1 , 2 ,( )/ (1 )k t k t k t k trκ β β κ β κ+ +Π = Π− Π + + + Π − Π +   for 
*0 kt T≤ < .                  (31) 
Iterating (40) backward in time allows to compute country k inflation at dates 
*0 .kt T≤ <
21
 
Importantly, the largest root of the “backward” inflation iteration equation (31) exceeds unity. 
Thus, the backward inflation loop is explosive (as noted by Cochrane (2017) and Maliar and 
Taylor (2019), in related models). This implies that the response of inflation at t=0 to the shock 
that triggers a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap can be large, as confirmed by the simulations 
below. Also, shocks to the natural real interest rate that induce small changes in the inflation rate 
in period 
*,kT   i.e. when country k emerges from the liquidity trap, may have a big effect on 
                                                 
20 In a world without ZLB constraint, the monetary policy rule (5) is replaced by: , 1 ,1 / ( / ) ( )k t k ti πβ γ β++ =Π + ⋅ Π −Π  
which implies  , 1 ,1 k t kti πγ++ = Π  for k=H,F.   
21 Inflation in 
*
1T −  (last period of the liquidity trap) is * * * ** *, 1 , , 1 , 1( )/ (1 )H T H T H T H Trκ β β κ β κ− + −Π = Π− Π+ + + Π − Π +   etc. 
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inflation, and thus on output, at the start of the liquidity trap. This explains, for example, why 
fiscal multipliers in a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap can be very large (see below).   
 Table 2 reports dynamic shock responses, when both countries are in a fundamentals-
driven liquidity trap. (In Sect. 5, I also consider a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap in just one 
country.) All preference, technology and price stickiness parameters are set at the values used in 
previous Sections (thus the autocorrelation of the exogenous forcing processes is again set at 
ρ=0.95).    
Following Blanchard et al. (2016), I consider a baseline fundamentals-driven liquidity 
trap scenario that lasts 12 quarters. That baseline scenario is brought about by  unanticipated one-
time -9.89% identical innovations to the Home and Foreign preference shifters (Ψ)  at t=0 that 
depresses the natural real interest rate in both countries by 46 basis points, on impact. Panel (a) 
in Table 2 reports the dynamics of the two countries, under the baseline liquidity trap scenario.
22
 
Panel (b) shows dynamic responses that obtain when positive 1% date t=0 innovations to Home 
productivity, Home government purchases and the Home preference shifter (Ψ) are added to the 
baseline liquidity trap scenario; those dynamic responses are shown as deviations from the 
baseline liquidity trap scenario.  
The simulations in Table 2 highlight important qualitative and quantitative transmission 
differences across expectations- and fundamentals-driven liquidity traps.  
The baseline fundamentals-driven liquidity trap scenario features a sharp, but short-lived, 
contraction in inflation, output and consumption. Inflation and output drop by 26 ppt p.a. and by 
13%, respectively, on impact. The effect (in absolute value) of a fundamentals-driven liquidity 
trap is strongly increasing in the duration of the trap, e.g., when the fundamentals-driven 
liquidity trap is lengthened by only 3 quarters (to 15 quarters), the initial drops in inflation and 
output are  92 ppt p.a. and 43%, respectively. That very strong sensitivity of inflation and output 
to the length of the fundamentals-driven liquidity trap is unappealing. The model variant with 
expectations-driven ZLB regimes is better suited for generating persistent liquidity traps. In that 
model variant, assuming more persistent liquidity traps (by raising ZLB regime persistence 
pSS=pBB above the baseline 0.95 value; see Sect. 3) has a minor effect on inflation and output.  
                                                 
22 To save space, I only report responses 0, 5  and 12 periods after the shock (period 12 corresponds to the first 
period after exit from the liquidity trap).  
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As a unit trade elasticity is assumed in the present model version, it predicts that country-
specific productivity and government purchases shocks only affect inflation and output in the 
country that receives the shock (see Panel (b)). By contrast, preference shocks induce 
international spillovers.  
In a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap, a Home productivity increase has a strong 
negative effect on Home inflation and output; on impact, a 1% Home productivity innovation 
lowers Home inflation and output by 32 ppt and 15%, respectively (see Panel (b) in Table 2). 
Intuitively, a persistent productivity increase lowers Home inflation, when the country emerges 
from the liquidity trap. The explosive backward iteration described above (see (31)) then implies 
a strong fall in Home inflation, at the start of the liquidity trap. The sharp initial contraction in 
Home inflation is accompanied by a strong contraction in Home output and in Home 
consumption. Due to full risk sharing, the Home consumption contraction is associated with a 
strong appreciation of the Home nominal and real exchange rates (and an improvement in the 
Home terms of trade).  
A positive innovation to Home government purchases has a strong positive initial effect 
on  Home inflation and output. This is accompanied by a sizable depreciation of the Home real 
exchange rate and a rise in Home consumption. The fiscal spending multiplier is big (9.2, on 
impact).  
The previous literature on fundamentals-driven liquidity traps has highlighted non-
standard (topsy-turvy) output responses to productivity shocks, as well as the large fiscal 
multipliers in fundamentals-driven liquidity traps (e.g., Eggertsson (2010), Eggertsson and 
Krugman (2012)). However, the “unorthodox” response of the real exchange rate to productivity 
and fiscal shocks has apparently not previously been noticed. 
The next Section considers a model version with a non-unitary trade elasticity. That 
version gives rise to international spillovers that can be qualitatively different and much larger in 
fundamentals-driven liquidity traps than in expectations-driven traps.  
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
5.1. Trade elasticity larger than unity 
I now replace the Cobb-Douglas Home consumption aggregator used in the baseline model (see 
Sect. 2.1) by the CES aggregator 
1/ ( 1) / 1/ ( 1) / /( 1)
, , ,{ ( ) (1 ) ( ) }
H F
H t H t H tC Y Y
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φξ ξ− − −≡ + − where φ (with 
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φ>0, φ≠1) is the  substitution elasticity between domestic and imported intermediates (trade 
elasticity). As before, 12 1ξ< <  is assumed (consumption home bias). The Cobb-Douglas 
aggregator implies a unit substitution elasticity, φ=1.23 The Appendix derives the solution for 
φ≠1. A key finding is that, for φ≠1, a country’s Euler-Phillips equation involves domestic and 
foreign inflation, and that the natural real interest rate depends on domestic and foreign 
productivity and government purchases.  
 Many open economy macro models assume φ>1. The following model simulations set 
φ=1.5. That value is consistent with time-series estimates of the price elasticity of aggregate 
trade flows (Kollmann (2001)), and it is, e.g., used in the canonical two-country international 
Real Business Cycle model of Backus et al. (1994).
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 As shown in the Appendix, a flex-prices model predicts that a positive shock to Home 
productivity raises Home net exports and lowers Foreign output when φ>1; intuitively, the terms 
of Home trade deterioration triggered (under flexible prices) by a rise in Home productivity 
induces stronger expenditure-switching away from Foreign goods, when φ>1 (compared to the 
baseline case φ=1), which raises Home net exports and lowers Foreign output. By contrast, a 
positive shock to Home government purchases lowers Home net exports and raises Foreign 
output when φ>1, which reflects  stronger expenditure switching towards Foreign goods, in 
response to the Home terms of trade appreciation triggered by the fiscal shock. As discussed 
below, the same qualitative international transmission effects obtain in an expectations-driven 
liquidity trap, under sticky prices, if shocks are persistent.  
 Preference shocks already generate international spillovers when a unit trade elasticity is 
assumed (φ=1). Qualitatively, responses to preference shocks do not change when φ>1 is 
assumed. To save space, the simulations and discussions of the economy with φ>1 thus focus on 
productivity and government purchases shocks.    
 Table 3 reports shows impact responses to 1% positive innovations to Home productivity 
and to Home government purchases, in a sticky-prices model version with expectations-driven 
ZLB regimes, for trade elasticity φ=1.5; all other parameters are unchanged compared to Table 
                                                 
23 The Cobb-Douglas aggregator is the limit of the CES aggregator as φ →1. 
24 Values of φ  in the range of 1.5 are also produced by econometric estimates of multi-county structural macro 





 Panel (a) shows responses that obtain when both countries are in a liquidity trap, Panel (b) 
assumes that only country Home is in a liquidity trap, and Panel (c) assumes that the ZLB 
constraint is slack in both countries. Shock responses of Home and Foreign output and 
consumption, and of the terms of trade and net exports are similar to the responses predicted by a 
flex-prices model, and that irrespective of the (Home and Foreign) ZLB regimes (flex-prices 
decision rules for φ=1.5 are reported in the Appendix).  With φ=1.5, a Home productivity 
increase raises Home next exports and lowers Foreign output. A rise in Home government 
purchases lowers Home net exports; it raises Foreign output, while reducing Foreign 
consumption. When φ=1.5, the domestic and foreign transmission of Home shocks depends on 
the Foreign ZLB regime, but the effect of the foreign ZLB regime is very weak (see Panel (c)). 
 I next turn to shock responses in a sticky-prices model version with fundamentals-driven 
liquidity traps, for trade elasticity φ=1.5; see Table 4. 26 Those shock responses again indicate 
important qualitative and quantitative differences compared to expectations-driven liquidity 
traps. Panel (a) of Table 4 considers the case where both countries are in a fundamentals-driven 
liquidity trap (induced by identical negative Home and Foreign preference shocks). The effects 
of innovations to Home productivity and government purchases on Home inflation, output and 
the terms of trade are similar to the ones predicted under φ=1. E.g., it is again found that, in a 
fundamentals-driven liquidity trap, a rise in Home productivity triggers a strong transitory fall in 
Home inflation and output, and a marked transitory improvement in the Home terms of trade, 
while a rise in Home government purchases triggers a strong rise in Home inflation and output, 
and a deterioration of the Home terms of trade. However, when the trade elasticity exceeds 
unity, the rise in Home productivity reduces Home net exports and it raises Foreign output 
(while these variables are unaffected under a unit trade elasticity), when both countries are in a 
fundamentals-driven liquidity trap. The intuition is that, with the higher trade elasticity, the 
improvement of the Home terms of trade (triggered by the Home productivity shock) induces 
stronger expenditure switching towards Foreign goods. By the same logic, the rise in Home 
government purchases raises Home net exports, and lowers Foreign output, due to a stronger 
                                                 
25 Thus, the autocorrelation of fundamental shocks is again set at ρ=0.95, and the  probability of remaining in the 
same ZLB regime is pSS=pBB=.95.   
26 Table 4 is a counterpart to Table 2, for φ=1.5. Thus, again, baseline fundamentals-driven liquidity trap scenarios 
are assumed that are triggered by large negative preference shocks and last 12 periods. Dynamic responses to 1% 
productivity and government purchases innovations are again reported as differences compared to the baseline 
liquidity trap scenarios.  
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expenditure switching effect towards Home goods, induced by the worsening of the Home terms 
of trade (triggered by the shock). Hence, with φ=1.5, international spillover effects are opposite 
of those predicted in an expectations-driven liquidity trap. 
 Panel (b) of Table 4 considers a case in which only country Home is in a fundamentals-
drive liquidity trap, while the Foreign ZLB constraint does not bind (the Home liquidity trap is 
brought about by a large negative Home preference shock). In that environment, a Home 
productivity increase again leads to a sharp Home terms of trade improvement, a worsening of 
Home net exports and a rise in Foreign output. By contrast, a Foreign productivity increase 
worsens the Foreign terms of trade and improves Foreign net exports (i.e. Home terms of trade 
improve, and Home net exports fall), and Home output falls.  
 
5.2. Less persistent shocks 
The previous simulations assumed persistent shocks (ρ=0.95), in line with empirical 
autocorrelations, and with autocorrelations typically assumed in macro models.  In an 
expectations-driven liquidity trap, a transient productivity increase lowers the inflation rate, 
while a transient increase in government purchases raises the inflation rate (see discussion in 
Sec. 3.2.1). These predicted inflation responses are opposite to the ones that obtain under 
persistent shocks. Table 5 shows impact effects of Home productivity and government purchases 
innovations, for a sticky-prices model version with expectations-driven ZLB regimes, assuming 
a ρ=0.5 shock autocorrelation; the trade elasticity is set at φ=1.5, to allow for international output 
spillovers. All other parameters are the same as in Table 3.  
Transitory shocks have a bigger effect on the natural real interest rate, and they trigger a 
greater (absolute) inflation response, on impact. For example, a 1% Home productivity 
innovation now lowers Home inflation by 1.89 ppt, on impact, when both countries are in an 
expectations-driven liquidity trap (Panel (a), Table 5); the strong Home inflation decrease is 
accompanied by a contraction in Home output and consumption, and by an improvement of the 
Home terms of trade, a fall in Home net exports and a rise in Foreign output. The strong rise of 
Home inflation triggered by a transitory rise in Home government purchases implies that Home 
output rises markedly more, on impact, than in response to a persistent government purchases 
shock; a transitory Home fiscal shock deteriorates the Home terms of trade, raises Home net 
exports and lowers Foreign output. In an expectations-driven liquidity trap, responses to transient 
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productivity shock differ thus qualitatively from the responses to persistent shocks discussed 
above, and they also deviate markedly from responses under flexible prices.  
In fact, for ρ=0.5, shock responses under an expectations-driven liquidity trap are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to responses under a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap. 
This can be seen from Table 6, where a sticky-prices model with fundamentals-driven liquidity 
traps is considered, in which the autocorrelations of productivity and government purchases are 
set at ρ=0.5 (φ=1.5 is assumed). All other parameters are the same as in Table 4. 27 In 
fundamentals-driven liquidity traps, the responses to transitory productivity and government 
purchases shocks are weaker than responses to persistent shocks, but the qualitative features of 
shock responses are unchanged; e.g., it remains true that a positive Home productivity shock 
lowers Home output, improves the Home terms of trade, lowers Home net exports and raises 
Foreign output.  
   
6. Conclusion 
This paper has studied a New Keynesian model of a two-country world with a zero lower bound 
(ZLB) constraint for nominal interest rates. A floating exchange rate regime is assumed. The 
presence of the ZLB generates multiple equilibria driven by self-fulfilling domestic and foreign 
inflation expectation, and recurrent liquidity traps of random duration. Expectations-driven 
liquidity traps can either be synchronized or unsynchronized across countries. Theories of 
expectations-driven liquidity traps are well-suited for explaining long-lasting liquidity traps. The 
domestic and international transmission of persistent fundamental business cycle shocks in an 
expectations-driven liquidity trap differs markedly (both qualitatively and quantitatively) from 
shock transmission in a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap. In an expectations-driven liquidity 
trap, persistent productivity and government purchases shocks trigger responses of real activity 
and the exchange rate that are similar to standard predicted responses that obtain when the ZLB 
does not bind. E.g., a persistent Home productivity increase raises Home output and depreciates 
the Home real exchange rate, both at the ZLB and away from the ZLB. For a trade elasticity 
greater than unity, the model with expectations-driven liquidity traps developed here predicts 
                                                 
27 To facilitate comparison with the predicted shock responses shown in Table 4, Table 6 assumes the same 
fundamentals-driven liquidity trap scenarios as Table 4; thus, in both Tables, the baseline liquidity trap scenarios are 
induced by negative preference shocks whose autocorrelation is 0.95; the sole difference between the two Tables is 
that the autocorrelation of productivity and fiscal shocks is 0.95 in Table 4, compared to the 0.5 autocorrelation in 
Table 6.  
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that a persistent rise in Home productivity raises Home net exports and lowers Foreign output, 
while a persistent rise in Home government purchases lowers Home net exports and raises 
Foreign output. These international spillover effects are opposite of those predicted in a 
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APPENDIX: MODEL VERSION WITH NON-UNITARY TRADE ELASTICITY 
This Appendix discusses a model variant in which the Cobb-Douglas Home consumption 
aggregator (see Sect. 2.1 in the main text) is replaced by the CES aggregator:
1/ ( 1) / 1/ ( 1) / /( 1)
, , ,{ ( ) (1 ) ( ) }
H F
H t H t H tC Y Y
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φξ ξ− − −≡ + − where φ (with φ>0, φ≠1) is the substitution 
elasticity between (aggregate) domestic and imported intermediates , ,( , ).
H F
H t H tY Y  The Cobb-
Douglas aggregator implies a unit substitution elasticity, φ=1.28 As before, 12 1ξ< <  is assumed 
(consumption home bias). The demand for domestic and imported intermediates by the Home 
consumer is now given by , , , ,( / )
H
H t H t H t H tY C P CPI
φξ −= ⋅ ⋅  and , , , ,(1 ) ([ / ]/ ) ,
F
H t H t F t t H tY C P S CPI
φξ −= − ⋅ ⋅  
where 1 1 1/(1 ), , ,[ ( ) (1 ) ( / ) ]H t H t F t tCPI P P S
φ φ φξ ξ− − −≡ ⋅ + − ⋅  is the country H final consumption price (i.e. 
the marginal cost of the final consumption good). 
The Home terms of trade and the real exchange rate are defined as , ,/t t H t F tq S P P≡  and 
, ,
/ ,
H t F tt tRER S CPI CPI≡  respectively. Note that 
1 1 1/(1 ){[ ( ) (1 )]/[ (1 ) ( ) ]} .
t t tRER q q
φ φ φξ ξ ξ ξ− − −= ⋅ + − + − ⋅   
Due to household consumption home bias (2ξ-1>0), the real exchange rate is an increasing 
function of the terms of trade. The real price of the Home domestic intermediate good, in units of 
Home final consumption, 1 1/(1 ), ,/ /[ ( ) (1 )] ,H t H t t tP CPI q q
φ φξ ξ− −= ⋅ + −  too is an increasing function of the 
terms of trade. Linearization of these equations around a symmetric deterministic steady state 
gives: (2 1)
t t
RER qξ= − ⋅   and , ,/ (1 ) .H t H t tP CPI qξ= − ⋅  The real price of Foreign intermediates (in 
units of Foreign final consumption) obeys  , ,/ (1 ) .F t F t tP CPI qξ= − − ⋅  
Using the above intermediate good demand functions, the market clearing conditions for 
Home and Foreign intermediates can be expressed as 
                          , , , , , , , ,( / ) (1 ) ([ ]/ )H t H t H t H t F t H t t F t H tY C P CPI C P S CPI G
φ φξ ξ− −= ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ +   
                   and  , , , , , , , ,(1 ) ([ / ]/ ) ( / ) .F t H t F t t H t F t F t F t F tY C P S CPI C P CPI G
φ φξ ξ− −= − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ +  
Linearization of these market clearing conditions around a symmetric steady state with zero 
government purchases gives:  
   , , , ,(1 ) 2 (1 )H t H t F t t H tY C C q Gξ ξ φξ ξ= + − − − +   and   , , , ,(1 ) 2 (1 )F t H t F t t F tY C C q Gξ ξ ξ ξ φ= − + + − + .    (A.1)   
                                                 
28 The Cobb-Douglas aggregator is the limit of the CES aggregator as φ →1. 
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The market clearing conditions (7) in the baseline model are a special case (for φ=1) of (A.1). 
The other linearized aggregate equilibrium conditions do not involve the trade elasticity φ, and 
thus these conditions continue to hold unchanged when  φ≠1 is assumed, namely the risk sharing 
condition (6), the Phillips equations (9), the equations defining real marginal cost (10), the Euler 
equations (8) and the monetary policy interest rate rules (11). These equations are restated here, 
for convenience:  
                                   , , , ,(2 1)H t F t t H t F tC C qξ− = − − + Ψ −Ψ ;                                         (A.2)                        
                                 , , , 1k t w k t t k tmc Eκ β +Π = ⋅ + Π  for k=H,F;                                           (A.3) 
       1 1, , , ,(1 ) (1 )H t H t H t H t tmc C Y qη η θ ξ= + − + − −    and  1 1, , , ,(1 ) (1 ) ;F t F t F t F t tmc C Y qη η θ ξ= + − + + −      (A.4) 
                    , 1 , 1 , 1 , , , 11 { }
CPI
k t t k t k t k t k t k ti E C C+ + + ++ = Π + − +Ψ −Ψ  for k=H,F;                              (A.5) 
                            , 1 ,(1 ) { ( )/ , }k t k ti Max πβ γ++ = − Π− Π ⋅Π   for k=H,F.                              (A.6) 
 
The model can be solved in the following steps: (I) Use the static model equations 
(A.1),(A.2),(A.4) and the Phillips equations (A.3) to express Home and Foreign output, 
consumption and the terms of trade as  functions of current and expected inflation and of the 
exogenous variables. (II) Substitute the resulting formulae for consumption and the terms of 
trade into the Euler equations, to write the Euler equations in terms of inflation and exogenous 
variables. (III) Find an inflation process that satisfies those Euler equations.  
 
Let  , , , ,( , , , , )t H t F t H t F t tA Y Y C C q≡  be a 5x1 column vector containing Home and Foreign output, 
consumption and the terms of trade. Let  , , , 1 , 1( , , , )t H t F t t H t t F tB E E+ +≡ Π Π Π Π   be a column 
vector of current and expected future Home and Foreign producer price inflation, and let 
, , , , , ,( , , , , , )t H t F t H t F t H t F tX G Gθ θ≡ Ψ Ψ  be a column vector listing the exogenous variables.  
(A.1)-(A.4) defines a system of 5 equations in , ,t t tA B X  that can be used to express the vector 
tA  as linear functions of  tB  and :tX  
                                                             1 2 ,t t tA B X= Γ + Γ                                                       (A.7) 
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where 1Γ and 2Γ are 7x4 and 7x6 matrices, respectively, whose elements are functions of the 
model parameters.  
Let 
1 1,H ηη
+≡ >  2 (1 ) 0ξ ξΞ≡ − > and {( 1)2( 1) } 0.D H Hφ≡ − − Ξ+ >  Country k output, 
consumption, net exports and the terms of trade can be expressed as functions of current and 
expected future inflation and of exogenous shocks:   
 
          1 1, , , 1 , , 1{( 1)(2 1) } [ ] ( 1) [ ]k t k t t k t l t t l tD DY H H E Eκ κφ β φ β+ += − − Ξ+ ⋅ Π − Π − − Ξ ⋅ Π − Π +                      
                                   1 1, ,{( 1)(2 1) } ( 1)k t l tD DH Hφ θ φ θ− − Ξ+ ⋅ − − Ξ ⋅ +    
                                   1 1 1 1, ,{( 1) 1} ( 1)
H H
k t l tD H D H
G Gφ φ− −− Ξ + ⋅ + Ξ − ⋅ −   
                                              1 , ,(( 1) 1 ) ( ),kt ltD φ ξ− Ξ + − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ     for k,l∈{H,F}, l≠k,               (A.8) 
 
1 1
, , , 1 , , 1{( 1)( 1) }[ ] {( 1)( 1) (1 ) }[ ]k t k t t k t l t t l tD DC H H E H H Eκ κφ ξ β φ ξ β+ += − − Ξ+ ⋅ Π − Π + − − Ξ+ − ⋅ Π − Π +
                         1 1, ,{( 1)( 1) } {( 1)( 1) (1 ) }k t l tD DH H H Hφ ξ θ φ ξ θ− − Ξ+ ⋅ + − − Ξ+ − ⋅ −  
1 1 1 1
, ,( 1){( 1) } ( 1){( 1) 1 }
H H
k t l tD H D H
H G H Gφ ξ φ ξ− −− − Ξ + ⋅ − − − Ξ + − ⋅ +    
                                1 , ,{ ( 1) 1 } ( )kt ltD Hφ ξ⋅ − Ξ+ − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ  for k,l∈{H,F}, k≠l;                              (A.9) 
 
                               1, , , 1 , , 1( 1) [( ) ( )]k t k t t k t l t t l tDNX H E Eκ φ β β+ += Ξ − ⋅ Π − Π − Π − Π +   
                                      1 1, , , ,( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( )k t l t k t l tD DH H G Gφ θ θ φΞ − ⋅ − − − Ξ − ⋅ − −  
                                1 , ,(1 ){( 1)2 1} ( )k t l tD H ξ φ ξ− − + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ     for k,l∈{H,F}, l≠k;                      (A.10) 
 
                                  1 , , , 1 , 1[( ) ( )]t H t F t t H t t F tDq H E Eκ β + += − Π −Π − Π − Π −               
                   1 1 1, , , , , ,( ) ( 1)( ) {(2 1)( 1) 1}( )H t F t H t F t H t F tD D DH H G G Hθ θ ξ− + − − + − − + Ψ −Ψ ;               (A.11) 
 
These equations hold both at the ZLB and away from the ZLB. Note that, for a unitary trade 
elasticity, φ=1, the slope coefficients of foreign inflation, foreign productivity and foreign 
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government purchases in the country k output equation are zero: output just depends on domestic 
inflation, domestic productivity, domestic government purchases and domestic and foreign 
preference shocks. When φ=1, then net exports only depend on (domestic and foreign) 
preference shocks. By contrast, for φ≠1, domestic and foreign inflation and productivity and 
government purchases shocks affect output and net exports.  
To complete the model solution, we substitute the preceding equations into the Home and 
Foreign Euler equations (A.5). A country’s Euler equation involves the growth rate of nominal 
consumption spending (in national currency); see (A.5). That growth rate can be written as:  
                          , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 ,
CPI
k t k t k t k t k t k tC C Z Z+ + + +Π + − = Π + − ,   for k=H,F,                          (A.12) 
with , , (1 )H t H t tZ C qξ≡ − −  and , , (1 )F t F t tZ C qξ≡ + −   (see Sect. 2.6).  Using (A.9) and (A.11), we can 
express ,k tZ  as  
 1 1, , , 1 , , 1 ,{( 1)( 1) } [ ] ( 1)( 1) [ ] ,
Flex
k t k t t k t l t t l t k tD D
Z H H E H E Zκ κφ β φ β+ += − − Ξ+ ⋅ Π − Π + − − Ξ ⋅ Π − Π +    (A.13)           
                     with  1 1, , ,{( 1)( 1) } ( 1)( 1)
Flex
k t k t l tD D
Z H H Hφ θ φ θ≡ − − Ξ+ ⋅ + − − Ξ ⋅ −    
                                 
2( 1)1 1 1
, ,( 1){( 1) 1} ( 1)
HH
k t l tD H D H
H G Gφ φ −−− − Ξ+ ⋅ − − Ξ⋅ +     
                                    1 , ,( 1){ ( 1) 1 } ( )kt l tD H φ ξ− Ξ − + − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ    for k,l∈{H,F}, l≠k.                 (A.14) 
Write (A.13) as  
                                                          , ,
Flex
k t k t k tZ B Z=Γ +   for  k=H,F,                                      (A.15) 
where kΓ  is a 1x4 row vector.  ,
Flex
k tZ  is a function only of exogenous variables. In a flex-prices 
world the slope of the Phillips curve is infinite: κ=∞. Thus, under flexible prices, the slope 
coefficients of inflation in (A.13) are zero, so that then , , .
Flex
k t k tZ Z=     
Using (A.12) and (A.15), the Euler equations (A.5) can be expressed in terms of the 
nominal interest rate, inflation and exogenous variables:  
                                       , 1 , 1 1 ,1 { ( )}k t t k t k t t k ti E B B r+ + ++ = Π + Γ − +   for  k=H,F                         (A.16) 
                                                   with , , ,(1 ){ }
Flex
k t k t k tr Zρ≡ − Ψ − .                                               (A.17) 
where I used the fact that , 1 ,t k t k tE ρ+Ψ = Ψ  and , 1 ,
Flex Flex
t k t k tE Z Zρ+ =  (as all forcing variables follow 
univariate AR(1) process with autocorrelation ρ).  
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,k tr  is the country k expected gross real interest rates (expressed as a relative deviation 
from the steady state gross real rate), defined in units of country k output, that would obtain in a 
flex-prices world. (Note that  , , 1 , 11k t k t t k tr i E+ += + − Π  holds in a flex-prices world, as there 
0).kΓ =  I refer to  ,k tr  as country k’s natural real interest rate (see Sect. 2.6). ,k tr  is a function of 
only exogenous variables.  
Let , , , 1 , 1 , 2 , 2( , , , , , )t H t F t t H t t F t t H t t F tD E E E E+ + + +≡ Π Π Π Π Π Π  be the 6x1 column vector 
containing Home and Foreign inflation at date t and expected inflation at t+1 and t+2. 
Combining the monetary policy rule (A.6) with Euler equation (A.16) gives:  
                                          , ,{ ( )/ , }k t k t k tMax D rπβ γ− Π− Π ⋅Π =Λ + , for k=H,F,                         (A.18) 
where kΛ is a 1x6 row vector of coefficients. I refer to this equation as the “Euler-Phillips” 
equation (see Sect. 2.6).   
 
To solve the model, we have to find processes for Home and Foreign inflation that solve 
the Euler-Phillips equation (A.18) for k=H,F. Once such processes have been determined, output, 
consumption, net exports and the terms of trade can be determined using (A.8)-(A.11).  
 Under a unitary trade elasticity, φ=1, the two countries’ Euler-Phillips equations are 
uncoupled: country k’s Euler equation depends on domestic inflation, but not on foreign 
inflation; this follows from the fact that, for  φ=1, ,k tZ  does not depend on foreign inflation (see 
(A.13)). Also, for φ=1, ,
Flex
k tZ  and the natural real interest rate do not depend on foreign 
productivity and government purchases. As mentioned above, country k output does not depend 
on foreign inflation, productivity and government purchases when φ=1 (see (A.8)), as discussed 
in the main text.   
 By contrast, for φ≠1, the country k Euler-Phillips equation depends on domestic and 
foreign inflation, and the country’s natural real interest rate depends on domestic and foreign 
productivity and government purchases. When φ>1 (as assumed in Sect. 5), then the natural real 
interest rate is decreasing in domestic and foreign productivity, and increasing in domestic and 
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foreign government purchases; however, the natural rate depends more strongly on domestic 
forcing variables than on foreign forcing variables. 
29
 
As in the baseline model with φ=1 discussed in the main text, there are multiple steady 
states when φ≠1. In steady state, the country k Euler-Phillips equation is 
{ ( )/ , }k kMax πβ γ− Π− Π ⋅Π =Π   (from (A.16)). Given our assumption that the Taylor principle 
holds ( 1),πγ >  this equation is solved by two steady state inflation rates: 0kΠ =  and 
( )/ .k βΠ =− Π− Π  The ZLB binds in the latter steady state. Note that, in steady state, the country 
k Euler-Phillips equation only depends on country k inflation. In steady state, the two countries’ 
Euler-Phillips equations are, thus, uncoupled.  A steady state liquidity trap can arise in country 
H, irrespective of whether there is a liquidity trap in country Foreign, and vice versa.  
 
Expectations-driven liquidity traps   
I construct equilibria with expectations-driven liquidity traps by assuming random self-fulfilling 
switches in agents’ inflation expectations. In the equilibria studied here, inflation in each country 
is a function of both countries’ ZLB regimes and of their natural real interest rates. Under a 
unitary trade elasticity φ=1 (as assumed in Sect. 3), the two countries’ Euler-Phillips equations 
are uncoupled, and a country’s equilibrium inflation decision rule only depends on the domestic 
ZLB regime and on the domestic natural real interest rate. However, for φ>1, the two countries’ 
Euler-Phillips equations are linked, and thus equilibrium inflation decision rules depend on the  
domestic and foreign ZLB regimes and on domestic and foreign natural real interest rates. 
Assume that the ZLB regimes follow a Markov chain. Denote the ZLB regime as 
{ , , , }tz BB BS SB SS∈  where ftz h= indicates that the Home ZLB state is h∈{B,S} while the 
Foreign ZLB state is  f∈{B,S} at date t; “B” indicates that the ZLB binds (liquidity trap), while 
“S” indicates that the ZLB constraint is slack. E.g. tz BS=  indicates that, at date t, the Home 
ZLB constraint binds, while the Foreign ZLB constraint is slack. Let ,
hf
k tΠ  denote the country k 
                                                 
29 This follows from the fact that, in the equation for ,k tZ ,  the slope coefficients of domestic productivity and 
government purchases are greater (in absolute values) than the coefficients of foreign productivity and government 
purchases, respectively  (see (A.13), (A.14)).  
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inflation rate at date t, when the Home ZLB regime is h, while the Foreign ZLB regime is f, with 
h,f∈{B,S}. Home and Foreign  inflation decision rules are given by:  
                                                    , , ,
hf hf hf hf
k t k k H t k F tr rμ λ ζΠ = + + ,                                              (A.19)                     
                                           with   f f, ,( )/
B S
H t H tπ πγ β γΠ ≤ − Π− Π < Π                                            
                                           and    , ,( )/
hB hS
F t F tπ πγ β γΠ ≤ − Π− Π < Π                                             
for country k∈{H,F} and Home/Foreign ZLB regimes h,f∈{B,S}.    
The numerical simulations assume that the two countries’ ZLB regimes are independent 
(see Sect. 3.2.3).  
The coefficients of the Home and Foreign decision rules can be determined using the 
method of undetermined coefficients, after substituting (A.19) into the Euler-Phillips equation 
(A.18). For the trade elasticity φ=1.5 assumed in the model simulations discussed in Sect. 5 it is 
again (as in the φ=1 case discussed in Sect. 3) found that the existence of an equilibrium with an 
occasionally binding ZLB constraint requires persistent ZLB regimes, i.e. the probabilities  SSp  
and BBp  defining the persistence of the ZLB regimes (see Sect. 3.2.3) have to be close to unity.  
The numerical simulations of model variants with occasionally binding ZLB constraints assume 
pBB=pSS=0.95. (Note: as the two countries are symmetric, the equilibrium decision rules are 
symmetric, i.e. ,
BB BB
H Fμ μ=  ,
BB BB
H Fλ ζ=  
BB BB
F Hλ ζ=  hold etc.)  
 
Fundamentals-driven liquidity traps   
With a non-unitary trade elasticity, φ≠1, computation of the fundamentals-driven liquidity trap 
proceeds along the same lines as in the φ=1 case discussed in Sect. 4. As in Sect. 4 it is assumed 
that fundaments-driven liquidity traps are brought about by unanticipated one-time preference 
shocks (Ψ) at some date t=0 that depress natural real interest rates. The simulations of 
fundaments-driven liquidity traps presented here assume that the economy evolves 
deterministically (perfect foresight), after t=0. As there are no exogenous innovations after date 
t=0, the natural real interest rate in country k=H,F at t≥0 is: , ,0 ,k t k
tr rρ= ⋅  where 0<ρ<1 is the 
autocorrelation of the exogenous forcing processes (and of the natural rate).  
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A key difference compared to the φ=1 case is that, with φ≠1, country k’s unconstrained 
inflation rate and the unconstrained nominal interest rate (i.e. the inflation and interest rates that 
would obtain in a world without ZLB constraints) depend on domestic and foreign natural real 
interest rates. E.g., the Home unconstrained inflation and interest rates are  
                         * , ,0 ,0
SS SS
H t H H F F
t t
r rλ ρ ζ ρΠ = +  and * *, 1 , ,H t H ti πγ+ = Π                                        
where 
SS
Hλ  and 
SS
Fζ  are Home inflation decision rule coefficients, for a regime with permanently 
slack Home and Foreign ZLB constraints (in such a regime the inflation decision rule has a zero 
intercept). A fundamentals-driven liquidity trap occurs when, for at least one of the two 
countries, the unconstrained nominal interest rate is negative at t=0, i.e. when (expressing the 
interest rate in deviation from steady state): * ,1 ( )/Hi β< − Π− Π  and/or 
*
,1 ( )/ .Fi β< − Π− Π  If only 
one of the countries has an unconstrained negative nominal interest rate at date t=0, then define 
*
T  as the smallest date t>0 at which that country’s unconstrained interest rate takes a non-
negative value. If both countries have a negative unconstrained nominal interest rate at t=0, then 
let 
*
kT  be the smallest date t>0 at which country k’s unconstrained interest rate takes a non-
negative value, and define 
* * *max( , )H FT T T≡ , i.e. 
*
T  is the larger of the dates at which the two 
countries’ unconstrained nominal interest rate cross the zero threshold.   A fundamentals-driven 
liquidity trap equilibrium has the property that the ZLB constraint does not bind in either country 
at dates  
*t T≥ . Thus, *, ,k t k tΠ =Π  and 
*
, 1 , 1k t k ti i+ +=  hold for 
*
t T≥ . Inflation in periods *t T<  is 
computed by iterating the two countries’ Euler-Phillips equations backward. The known 
inflations rates * *
*
, ,k T k T
Π =Π  and * **, 1 , 1k T k T+ +Π =Π  for k=H,F are used to back out *, 1k T −Π  from 
country k=H,F date 
* 1T −  Euler-Phillips equation (A.18). Successive backward iterations allow 
to determine country k=H,F inflation for *0 .t T≤ <   
 
Flex-prices economy 
In a flex-prices economy, real marginal cost is constant, and thus , 0,k tmc =  for k=H,F, where real 
marginal cost is given by (A.4). This condition, plus market clearing conditions (A.1) and the 
risk sharing condition (A.2) allows to solve for real quantities in the flex-prices economy:  
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                             1 1, , ,{( 1)(2 1) } ( 1)k t k t l tD DY H Hφ θ φ θ= − − Ξ+ ⋅ − − Ξ ⋅ +    
                                   1 1 1 1, ,{( 1) 1} ( 1)
H H
k t l tD H D H
G Gφ φ− −− Ξ + ⋅ + Ξ − ⋅ −   
                                             1 , ,(( 1) 1 ) ( ),kt ltD φ ξ− Ξ + − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ     for k,l∈{H,F}, l≠k;              (A.20) 
 
               1 1, , ,{( 1)( 1) } {( 1)( 1) (1 ) }k t k t l tD DC H H H Hφ ξ θ φ ξ θ= − − Ξ+ ⋅ + − − Ξ+ − ⋅ −  
1 1 1 1
, ,( 1){( 1) } ( 1){( 1) 1 }
H H
k t l tD H D H
H G H Gφ ξ φ ξ− −− − Ξ + ⋅ − − − Ξ + − ⋅ +    
                                1 , ,{ ( 1) 1 } ( )kt ltD Hφ ξ⋅ − Ξ+ − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ  for k,l∈{H,F}, k≠l;                            (A.21) 
 
                          1 1, , , , ,( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( )k t k t l t k t l tD DNX H H G Gφ θ θ φ= Ξ − ⋅ − − − Ξ − ⋅ − −  
                                1 , ,(1 ){( 1)2 1} ( )k t l tD H ξ φ ξ− − + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ     for k,l∈{H,F}, l≠k.                       (A.22) 
 
                1 1 1, , , , , ,( ) ( 1)( ) {(2 1)( 1) 1}( )t H t F t H t F t H t F tD D Dq H H G G Hθ θ ξ= − + − − + − − + Ψ −Ψ .            (A.23) 
 
Note that these expression can be obtained from the sticky-prices model solution (A.8)-(A.11), 
by setting an infinite Phillips curve slope, κ=∞. Then terms involving inflation vanish in (A.8)-
(A.11). The remaining terms in (A.8)-(A.11) (involving the exogenous shocks) correspond to the 
flex-prices model solution (A.20)-(A.23).  
In a sticky-prices world, a monetary policy that fully stabilizes  PPI inflation rate, at the 
central bank’s inflation target, so that , 0k tΠ =  ∀t, entails that sticky-prices output, consumption, 
net exports and terms of trade equal the flex-prices counterparts of these variables. If inflation 
responses to exogenous shocks are sufficiently muted in a sticky-prices world, the transmission 
of those shocks to real activity will therefore resemble shock transmission under flexible prices.  
 For φ>1 (as assumed in Sect. 5.1), the flex-prices model  predicts negative transmission 
of productivity shocks to foreign output, but positive international transmission of government 
purchases shocks. For φ>1, a positive productivity shock raises net exports in the country that 
receives the shock, while an increase in government purchases reduces net exports.  
 For φ=1.5 and the other model parameters used in the simulations, the numerical solution 
of the flex-prices model is:  
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                      , , , , , , ,1.05 0.05 0.47 0.03 0.11 ( )k t k t l t k t l t k t l tY G Gθ θ= ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ ,                
                     , , , , , , ,0.83 0.17 0.42 0.08 0.21 ( )k t k t l t k t l t k t l tC G Gθ θ= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ ,                
                          , , , , , , ,0.10 ( ) 0.05 ( ) 0.22 ( )k t k t l t k t l t k t l tNX G Gθ θ= ⋅ − − ⋅ − + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ ,                        
                         , , , , , ,0.90 ( ) 0.45 ( ) 0.78 ( )t H t F t H t F t H t F tq G Gθ θ= − ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ ,                       










Table 1. Baseline model with expectations-driven ZLB regimes: dynamic responses to 




Hi    ΠH     YH     CH Fi  ΠF YF CF q S NXH 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(a) Binding Home and Foreign ZLB constraints 
Home productivity increase (1%) 
0  0.00 0.27 1.06 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 -1.06 -1.13 0.00 
12 0.00 0.16 0.57 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.57 -1.24 0.00 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%) 
0  0.00 -0.14 0.47 -0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.53 0.56 0.00 
12 0.00 -0.07 0.25 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.29 0.62 0.00 
 
Home preference shock (1%) 
0  0.00 -0.26 -0.12 0.13 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.19 0.92 0.98 -0.13 
12 0.00 -0.14 -0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.10 0.50 1.08 -0.07 
 
 
(b) Slack Home and Foreign ZLB constraints 
Home productivity increase (1%) 
0  -0.39 -0.26 0.94 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 -0.94 -0.89 0.00 
12 -0.21 -0.14 0.51 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.51 0.12 0.00 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%) 
0  0.19 0.13 0.53 -0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.47 0.44 0.00 
12 0.11 0.07 0.29 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.26 -0.06 0.00 
 
Home preference shock (1%) 
0  0.36 0.24 -0.01 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.17 0.82 0.76 -0.13 
12 0.20 0.13 -0.01 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.44 -0.10 -0.07 
 
Notes: A model variant with expectations-driven ZLB regimes is considered. Trade elasticity: φ=1. 
Probability of remaining in the same ZLB regime next period: pBB=pSS=0.95. Autocorrelation of 
productivity, government purchases and preference shifter (Ψ): 0.95. 
Panel (a): simultaneous Home and Foreign liquidity traps; Panel (b): slack Home and Foreign ZLB 
constraints. 
Shock responses 0 and 12 periods (see Column labelled ‘Horizon’) after 1% innovations to Home 
productivity (θ
H
), Home government purchases (G
H
) and to the Home preference shifter (Ψ
H
) are shown. 
The responses pertain to simulation runs without ZLB regime changes. 
















), Home terms of trade (q), nominal exchange rate (S) and 
Home net exports/GDP ratio (NX
H
). (A rise in ‘q’ is a Home terms of trade improvement and corresponds to 
an appreciation of the Home real exchange rate; a rise in ‘S’ is  an appreciation of the Home nominal 
exchange rate.)  
Responses of output, consumption, terms of trade and nominal exchange rate are reported as % 
deviations from the symmetric steady state. Responses of interest rates and inflation are reported as 








Table 2. Baseline model with Home and Foreign fundamentals-driven liquidity traps: baseline 
liquidity trap scenario and dynamic responses to persistent exogenous shocks  
 
                                                                                                                                  
Horizon  
Hi    ΠH     YH     CH Fi  ΠF YF CF q S NXH 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(a) Baseline liquidity trap scenario (triggered by -9.89% Home and Foreign preference shock)  
 0 0.00 -26.55 -13.60 -13.60 0.00 -26.55 -13.60 -13.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 5 0.00 -2.98 -1.70 -1.70 0.00 -2.98 -1.70 -1.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12   0.15 0.10 -0.15 -0.15 0.15 0.10 -0.15 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(b) Dynamic responses to shocks (shown as difference relative to baseline liquidity trap scenario)  
Home productivity increase (1%)         
 0 0.00 -31.84 -14.90 -12.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.94 14.90 22.82 0.00 
 5 0.00 -4.05 -1.30 -1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.17 1.30 22.82 0.00 
12 -0.15 -0.21 0.49 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.49 22.82 0.00 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%)        
 0 0.00 9.20 5.11 3.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 -4.11 -6.40 0.00 
 5 0.00 1.14 0.98 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.21 -6.40 0.00 
12 0.14 0.10 0.28 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.26 -6.44 0.00 
 
Home preference shock (1%)        
 0 0.00 14.80 7.37 6.73 0.00 1.20 0.67 1.31 -5.96 -9.35 -0.13 
 5 0.00 1.83 0.91 0.98 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.05 -0.21 -9.35 -0.10 
12 0.27 0.18 -0.02 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.46 -9.45 -0.07 
 
 
Notes: A model variant with simultaneous Home and Foreign fundamentals-driven liquidity traps (12 
periods) is considered. Trade elasticity: φ=1. Autocorrelation of productivity, government purchases and 
preference shifter (Ψ): 0.95.  
 Panel (a) reports the baseline liquidity trap scenario in which identical negative Home & Foreign 
preference shocks (-9.89%) induce Home and Foreign liquidity traps. Baseline paths (Panel (a)) of interest 
rates and inflation rates are shown in levels (not as deviations from steady state values) and expressed in 
percentage points (ppt) per annum; the baseline path of Home net exports/GDP ratio (NXH) too is reported 
in ppt levels. Baseline paths of other variables (Panel (a)) represent % deviations from steady state.  
 Panel (b) reports dynamic responses after 0, 5 and 12 periods (see Column labelled ‘Horizon’) triggered 
by 1% innovations to exogenous variables. The exogenous innovations are added to the baseline liquidity 
trap  scenario. Dynamic shock responses in Panel (b) are measured in the same units as the baseline paths 
(Panel (a)) and expressed as differences from the baseline paths shown in Panel (a).  (Thus, interest rates and 
inflation rates responses in Panel (b) are expressed in ppt per annum and net exports are expressed in ppt.) 














Table 3. Model with expectations-driven ZLB regimes, higher trade elasticity (φ=1.5): impact 
responses to persistent exogenous shocks  
 
Horizon  
Hi    ΠH     YH     CH Fi  ΠF YF CF q S NXH 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(a) Binding Home and Foreign ZLB constraints  
Home productivity increase (1%)         
  0.00 0.26 1.11 0.88 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.18 -0.95 -1.00 0.11 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%)        
  0.00 -0.13 0.44 -0.45 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.47 0.50 -0.05 
 
 
(b) Binding Home ZLB constraint, slack Foreign ZLB constraint  
Home productivity increase (1%)         
  0.00 0.26 1.11 0.88 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.17 -0.95 -1.02 0.11 
 
Foreign productivity increase (1%)         
  0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.16 -0.37 -0.25 0.99 0.79 0.85 0.78 -0.10 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%)        
  0.00 -0.13 0.45 -0.44 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.48 0.51 -0.05 
 
Foreign government purchases increase (1%)        
  0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.19 0.12 0.50 -0.39 -0.42 -0.39 0.05 
 
 
(c) Slack Home and Foreign ZLB constraints  
Home productivity increase (1%)         
  -0.37 -0.25 0.99 0.79 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.16 -0.85 -0.79 0.10 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%)        
  0.19 0.12 0.50 -0.39 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.43 0.40 -0.05 
 
 
Notes: A model variant with expectations-driven ZLB regimes is considered. Same set-up as in Table 1, 
except that a higher trade elasticity is assumed: φ=1.5.  
(Probability of remaining in the same ZLB regime next period: pBB=pSS=0.95. Autocorrelation of 
productivity, government purchases and preference shifter (Ψ): 0.95.)  
Panel (a): simultaneous Home and Foreign liquidity traps; Panel (b): Home liquidity trap, but slack 
Foreign ZLB; Panel (c): slack Home and Foreign ZLB constraints.  
 Responses to 1% innovations to exogenous variables are reported.  

















Table 4. Model with fundamentals-driven liquidity traps, higher trade elasticity (φ=1.5): 
dynamic responses to persistent exogenous shocks.  
 
Horizon  
Hi    ΠH     YH     CH Fi  ΠF YF CF q S NXH 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(a) Home and Foreign fundamental liquidity traps 
Home productivity increase (1%)         
 0 0.00 -34.59 -17.63 -13.54 0.00 3.26 2.98 -1.11 16.81 26.22 -1.90 
 5 0.00 -4.16 -1.48 -1.14 0.00 0.17 0.21 -0.12 1.38 26.22 -0.16 
12 -0.15 -0.20 0.52 0.41 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.44 26.22 0.05 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%)        
 0 0.00 9.93 5.85 3.75 0.00 -0.71 -0.72 0.38 -4.54 -7.20 0.51 
 5 0.00 1.17 1.02 0.19 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.23 -7.20 0.03 
12 0.14 0.09 0.26 -0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.24 -7.22 -0.03 
 
(b) Home fundamental liquidity trap (Foreign ZLB constraint does not bind) 
Home productivity increase (1%)         
 0 0.00 -34.40 -17.41 -13.70 1.20 0.80 1.27 -2.43 15.23 23.99 -1.72 
 5 0.00 -4.15 -1.47 -1.15 0.13 0.09 0.13 -0.19 1.30 24.74 -0.15 
12 -0.15 -0.20 0.52 0.41 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.44 24.81 0.05 
 
Foreign productivity increase (1%)        
 0 0.00 -1.49 -0.85 -0.47 -0.46 -0.30 1.08 0.70 1.58 1.87 -0.18 
 5 0.00 -0.18 -0.14 0.05 -0.39 -0.26 0.80 0.61 0.76 1.34 -0.09 
12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.27 -0.18 0.55 0.44 0.47 0.75 -0.05 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%)        
 0 0.00 9.91 5.81 3.78 -0.34 -0.23 -0.36 0.67 -4.21 -6.73 0.48 
 5 0.00 1.17 1.02 0.19 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.22 -6.95 0.02 
12 0.14 0.09 0.26 -0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.24 -6.99 -0.03 
 
Foreign government purchases increase (1%)                    
 0 0.00 0.52 0.30 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.47 -0.37 -0.68 -0.77 0.08 
 5 0.00 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.19 0.13 0.38 -0.31 -0.37 -0.50 0.04 
12 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.14 0.09 0.26 -0.22 -0.24 -0.21 0.03 
 
Notes: A model variant with fundamentals-driven liquidity traps (12 periods) is considered. Same set-up as 
in Table 2, except that a higher trade elasticity is assumed: φ=1.5. (Autocorrelation of productivity, 
government purchases and the preference shifter (Ψ): 0.95.)  
Panel (a) assumes simultaneous Home and Foreign fundamentals-driven liquidity traps (caused by -9.89% 
Home and Foreign preference shock).   
Panel (b) assumes a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap just in the Home country (caused by -11.09%  Home 
preference shock; there is no Foreign preference shock).  
 The Table shows dynamic responses of 1% innovations to exogenous variables that are added to baseline 
liquidity trap scenarios (the baseline scenario for Panel (a) is identical to the baseline scenario in Table 2; 
baseline scenario for Panel (b) is not reported); dynamic shock responses are expressed as differences from 
the respective baseline liquidity trap scenarios.    








Table 5.  Model with expectations-driven ZLB regimes, higher trade elasticity (φ=1.5):  
impact responses to less persistent exogenous shocks (autocorrelation: 0.5)  
 
    
Hi    ΠH     YH     CH Fi  ΠF YF CF q S NXH 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(a) Binding Home and Foreign ZLB constraints  
Home productivity increase (1%)         
  0.00 -1.89 -0.46 -0.36 0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.42 0.90 -0.05 
Home government purchases increase (1%)        
  0.00 0.94 1.23 0.18 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.21 -0.45 0.02 
           
 
(b) Binding Home ZLB constraint, slack Foreign ZLB constraint  
Home productivity increase (1%)          
  0.00 -1.89 -0.46 -0.36 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.41 0.88 -0.05 
Foreign productivity increase (1%)          
  0.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 -1.30 -0.86 0.42 0.33 0.38 0.18 -0.04 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%)         
  0.00 0.94 1.23 0.18 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.20 -0.44 0.02 
Foreign government purchases increase (1%)         
  0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.65 0.43 0.79 -0.16 -0.19 -0.09 0.02 
 
 
(c) Slack Home and Foreign ZLB constraints  
Home productivity increase (1%)          
  -1.30 -0.86 0.42 0.33 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.37 -0.16 0.04 
Home government purchases increase (1%)         
  0.65 0.43 0.79 -0.16 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.18 0.08 -0.02 
 
  
Notes: A model variant with expectations-driven ZLB regimes is considered. Same set-up as in Table 1, 
except that a higher trade elasticity (φ=1.5) is assumed, and that productivity and government purchases are 
less persistent (autocorrelation: 0.5).  (Probability of remaining in the same ZLB regime next period: 
pBB=pSS=0.95.)  
Panel (a): simultaneous Home and Foreign liquidity traps; Panel (b): Home liquidity trap, but slack 
Foreign ZLB; Panel (c): slack Home and Foreign ZLB constraints.  
 Responses to 1% innovations to exogenous variables are reported.  
 See Table 1 for definitions of variables and other information.  
 

















Table 6.  Model with fundamentals-driven liquidity traps, higher trade elasticity (φ=1.5): impact 
responses to less persistent exogenous shocks (autocorrelation: 0.5)  
 
      
Hi    ΠH     YH     CH Fi  ΠF YF CF q S NXH 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(a) Home and Foreign fundamental liquidity traps 
Home productivity increase (1%)         
  0.00 -2.03 -0.55 -0.43 0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.50 1.02 -0.06 
  
Home government purchases increase (1%)        
  0.00 1.01 1.27 0.21 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.25 -0.50 0.03 
 
(b) Home fundamental liquidity trap (Foreign ZLB constraint does not bind) 
Home productivity increase (1%)         
  0.00 -2.03 -0.55 -0.43 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.48 0.99 -0.05 
Foreign productivity increase (1%)         
  0.00 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 -1.18 -0.79 0.44 0.34 0.40 0.22 -0.05 
 
Home government purchases increase (1%)        
  0.00 1.01 1.27 0.21 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.24 -0.49 0.03 
Foreign government purchases increase (1%)                    
  0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.59 0.39 0.78 -0.17 -0.20 -0.11 0.02 
 
Notes: A model variant with fundamentals-driven liquidity traps (12 periods) is considered. Same set-up as in 
Table 2, except that a higher trade elasticity (φ=1.5) is assumed, and that productivity and government 
purchases are less persistent (autocorrelation: 0.5). The liquidity traps are generated by persistent one-time 
preference shocks (autocorrelations of the preference shocks: 0.95).  
Panel (a) assumes a simultaneous Home and Foreign fundamentals-driven liquidity trap (caused by -9.89% 
Home and Foreign preference shock).   
Panel (b) assumes a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap (12 periods) just in Home country (caused by -11.09% 
Home preference shock).  
 The Table shows dynamic responses of 1% innovations to exogenous variables that are added to baseline 
liquidity trap scenarios (the baseline scenario for Panel (a) is identical to the baseline scenario in Table 2; 
baseline scenario for Panel (b) is not reported); dynamic shock responses are expressed as differences from 
the respective baseline liquidity trap scenarios.    
 See Table 2 for definition of variables and other information.    
 
